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We argue that a) the idea of the Big Bang in its philosophical essence represents a sophisticated 
disguise of the problem of the historically contingent present of the universe’s display, and hence, b) 
the idea of the Big Bang represents an intellectual incarnation of the intuition about the historical 
boundaries of human transcendental consciousness as related to the whole of humanity as well as 
to any particular human being in the universe. Compared, a) and b) exhibit similarity in tackling a 
problem of a phenomenologically concealed origin of the universe and that of any particular human 
life. This analogy comes from an observation that in both cases the sense of comprehension of the given 
presence unfolds as a process of constitution of its antecedents: to understand the present and disclose 
its sense one must enquire into the events preceding it. However, the very process of this constitution 
as part of the embodied humanity subjected to the temporal irreversibility of macroscopic nature is 
directed to the future thus characterising in both cases the sought origin of the contingent state of 
the universe or of any particular human life as their telos. It is easy to understand that this counter-
intuitive conclusion is based on a certain understanding of temporality of human acts of consciousness 
and that the very history of the universe, as well as that of a human being, is unfolded from within this 
internal time-consciousness which characterises the developed, that is the adult state of mind.
Keywords: cosmology, universe, origin, birth, concealment, phenomenology, telos.
I cannot really stand aside from the universe, even in thought. 
Only by a meaningless pretence can I place myself at some vague 
point outside it, and from thence reproduce on a small scale the 
successive stages of its genesis. Nor can I place myself outside 
myself… and question myself upon my own genesis. I mean of course 
the genesis of my non-empirical, or metaphysical reality. The 
problem of the genesis of the I and of the genesis of the universe are 
just one and the same problem, or, more exactly, one and the same 
insoluble, the insolubility being bound up with my very position, my 
existence, and the radical metaphysical fact of that existence. 
--- G. Marcel, Being and Having, p. 24
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What is the reason for the genesis of the world, matter and 
life?... Why the fact of our birth, our inherited characteristics, our 
gender? Every attempt at definition is a fissure in the unapproachable 
void, a shudder of panic. 
--- C. Yannaras, Variations on the Song of Songs, p. 90-91
Introduction:  
Modern Cosmology  
on the Origin of the Universe
It is a matter of common understanding 
nowadays that with all respect to the grandiose 
achievements of modern science and cosmology 
in particular, scientific discourse in general, 
being efficient in interpreting the most non-
human aspects of reality, feels itself helpless 
and unable to advance in the face of the mystery 
in understanding of human persons who are 
creators of science and who are those agencies 
which make the universe palpable and act as its 
voice. This hidden predicament lies in the fact 
that cosmology, which is usually considered 
as a natural science1, is being constructed from 
within the natural attitude of the human mind 
which alienates its subject matter, by making 
its object devoid of any inherent references to 
human subjectivity thus removing insights into 
the conditions of that phenomenality which it 
deals with. The aim of this paper is to attempt 
to overcome the abovementioned predicament by 
placing the subject matter of cosmology and in 
particular the problem of the origin of the universe 
in the context of the interior life of subjectivity. 
It is known that the so called anthropic 
inference in cosmology attempts to link the 
natural conditions of human embodiment with 
the fundamental physical parameters which are 
responsible for the stability and actual display of 
the physical universe and which make it possible 
for conscious life to exist. However, what is 
articulated in the anthropic inference is physico-
biological conditions of human existence: it 
makes a nearly trivial observation that, indeed, 
there is an underlying consubstantiality between 
human observers and the universe expressed 
in some technical terms, such as, for example, 
the so called fine-tuning of physical constants 
(such numerical values of these constants whose 
precision is crucial for sustenance of earthly-based 
life-forms).2 However, even in this case, the very 
facticity of this consubstantiality, its particular 
contingent noetico-noematic givenness, is not 
accounted for from within scientific method and, 
probably, cannot be accounted for at all. But it 
is this very facticity (that is the facticity of the 
universe suitable for life as well as the facticity 
of life itself) which is ontologically responsible 
for the necessary conditions for multihypostatic 
embodiments of humanity, that is the plurality of 
conscious subjects, the plurality which cannot be 
simply explained in terms of the natural. Embodied 
persons, as particular contingent realisations 
of anonymous and impersonal physical laws 
disconcert cosmologists, who are eager to dismiss 
any trace of them as not falling into the rubrics of 
scientific objectivity and explanation: scientific 
objectivity does not deal with contingencies in 
spite of the fact that it is itself a mental creation of 
a contingent formation in the universe. Scientific 
objectivity cannot come to terms with the fact that 
the world, disclosed and constituted, is contingent 
in its immanence with this contingent formation – 
human consciousness.3 The whole edifice of 
cosmology manifests the universe but conceals 
intelligence as its noetic pole. The universe 
possesses in physical cosmology such an object-
like phenomenality which shows that the author 
of the scientific art-work of cosmology cannot 
be shown. This view points to a philosophical 
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link between the problem of the facticity of 
multihypostatic human consciousness and facticity 
of the universe. Indeed, since all consciousness 
is intentional, the primary object of this intention 
in cosmology is the universe in which this 
consciousness embodies. Consciousness gazes 
at the universe as that premise which sustains 
the very possibility of consciousness. Hence, 
in the same way that scientific anthropology 
and psychology cannot tackle the problem of 
any singular hypostatic existence4, cosmology 
cannot adequately approach the problem of the 
contingent facticity of the observed universe, 
that is its particular phenomenality linked to 
human agents. The constructive and nontrivial 
content of the anthropic inference is exactly the 
demonstration, by using physical propositions, of 
the interplay between a fundamental contingency 
of the universe (noematic pole) as well as that 
embodied consciousness (noetic pole) which 
grasps the universe. However, this contingency as 
such remains an ultimate unexplainable mystery. 
In spite of the inevitability of the just 
stated conclusion made with “negative 
certitude” pertaining to a philosophical mode 
of thinking, physical cosmology persistently 
attempts to escape a philosophical verdict on the 
unknowability of the facticity of the universe 
and to explain it away by referring to the initial 
conditions in the universe as if they would 
contain all “information” about the present and 
future of the universe. Let us reflect upon this 
motivation. The objective of physical cosmology 
is to “explain” the specificity of the state of affairs 
in the empirical, observable cosmos. We have a 
display of different objects in the sky, different 
structural and physical phenomena, observed 
by various physical means starting with optical 
astronomy and finishing by detecting high-
energy particles bombarding our planet from the 
outer space. There are two aspects in this variety 
of the natural phenomena: on the one hand we 
have some species of similar objects (let say 
galaxies or their clusters) which can be classified 
into groups; on the other hand there is a particular 
givenness of objects from these groups which 
display themselves in the cosmos in an absolutely 
contingent way (for example there are some 
particular famous galaxies which are associated 
with special directions in the sky: an obvious 
example is the Andromeda nebula which is seen 
by us through the constellation of Andromeda). 
On a smaller scale there are particular patterns of 
stars in our galaxy, which since ancient times have 
been grouped into constellations, whose display 
in the sky is contingent and given to us as it is. 
Another example of astronomical contingency is 
our planetary system which contains nine planets 
of particular sizes and parameters of their orbits. 
Since Kepler and later Newton the movement 
of planets is explained in terms of periods of 
revolution around their orbits in dependence on 
their spatial distance from the sun using known 
physical laws, but astronomy cannot explain the 
fact as to why there are nine planets (instead of 
twenty nine, for example) and why the concrete 
parameters of their revolution around the sun 
were set in an order which is observable now. 
In other words, neither astronomy nor physics 
can account for the initial conditions of the 
movements of various contingent objects in the 
universe in order to explain the specificity of 
their display in the sky (certainly an anthropic 
explanation from the fact of life can always be 
invoked: there must be necessary conditions in 
the very beginning of the universe which would 
allow life to develop). Said philosophically, the 
universe displays the contingent state of affairs 
on a huge spatial scale whose facticity and origin 
cosmology attempts to interpret, including the 
very physical laws which are employed in it. In 
pre-scientific eras “explanations” of the variety 
in the cosmos were given in mythological terms.5 
In modern terms, the idea of mythological 
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explanations amounts to an attempt to reduce 
the variety of contingent objects in the sky and 
peculiarities in their motions to a minimum, by 
representing the universal qualities of the cosmic 
display through symmetries and harmonies 
and by making all contingent happenings as 
derivatives and spontaneous outcomes from the 
rule.6 A characteristic feature of such an attempt 
is a conviction that the underlying “world” of 
highly symmetric (platonic) forms is actually 
co-existing with the empirical display, but is not 
perceived through the senses. This underlying 
world was treated as ever-existing reality, with 
no change and hence with some stable universal 
patterns so that the stability of the universe 
as its identity in the background of the flux of 
mundane things is secured in the mythological 
view through the reference to these intelligible 
patterns (platonic forms).
What makes contemporary scientific 
cosmology similar to and at the same time 
different from mythological cosmologies is 
that, as a scientific discipline, cosmology can 
function only in the condition if its “object” (the 
universe as a whole) sustains identity in time. 
Indeed, according to Kant experience is possible 
only if time is involved as an element of unity 
and synthesis. However, in cosmology, this is 
not an innocent requirement: for example, in the 
case of a static and infinite universe (that is, by 
assumption, existing forever) the identity of the 
universe in time, is a tautology for, de facto, there 
is no objective physical time in such a universe – 
it is static. Correspondingly the observable 
universe (because of the postulated finitude of 
the speed of light) would be an infinitesimal part 
of an incommensurably bigger whole which is 
principally beyond of any empirical grasp. 
In this case only could one legitimately 
talk about the identity of the visible part of the 
universe and infer (in a leap of faith) to the identity 
of the whole static and infinite universe. This in 
turn entails that the facticity of the observable 
universe would be the first and the last principle of 
its explanation, for there would not be possible to 
refer to any other state of the universe considered 
as an originary cause or an origin of the universe 
as we see it. 
The situation changes drastically in a 
standard cosmological model accepted nowadays 
based on the idea of universal becoming. The 
universe is expanding and the idea of the evolution 
of the universe is taken exactly as that time-
synthesis which is needed in order to preserve the 
unity of the universe as a whole. It provides us 
with images of the universe at different moments 
of time (a consequence of the finitude of the 
speed of light). The fact that the term “past” can 
be assigned to the universe as different from the 
ever-lasting present of the static universe (in a 
static universe the past is associated with ageing 
of the light signals but not with the evolving 
nature of its space related to the material stuff) 
is exactly related to the principle that there was 
an ultimate temporal beginning of the universe 
from which all its stages emerged and because of 
which one can observe the universe backward in 
time and in the entirety of its temporal span.
The ancient idea of the underlying eternal 
world becomes replaced here by another, but 
similar idea. This time cosmology finds refuge 
in saying that the present state of the observable 
universe (with its annoying contingent facticity) 
is the frozen instantaneous display of the 
temporal evolution of this universe from some 
remote initial state which in its seeds (through 
the laws of physics implanted there) contained the 
potentiality of all various features in the cosmic 
display. This kind of thinking naturally invokes 
the idea of the originary “past” of the universe 
whose partial consequences are displayed, 
a “past” as such which is not observable but 
“existed” physically long before that display 
which humanity looks at and speculates about. 
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What is also believed (and this is in some way 
supported by theory) is that this initial (early) state 
of the universe, in terms of physics and its logical 
presentation to human mind, is much “simpler” 
than the grandiose variety of different spatially 
and temporally disjoint objects displayed in the 
present universe because the initial condition 
is an idiosyncratic state of matter with either 
infinite or uncertain parameters. In spite of this 
uncertainty the motivation of cosmology remains 
the same: to explain away the contingent variety 
of objects and their species in the universe (as 
seen in the perspective of their “present”) by 
“sweeping these contingencies under the rug” of 
their undifferentiated unity in the “past” of the 
universe.
The hope that such an attempt will be 
successful suffers from two logical flaws 
which can be elucidated through philosophical 
analogies. First of all, a theoretical attempt to 
reduce all variety of forms and structures in 
the universe to rubrics of the allegedly existing 
undifferentiated unity (which could play a role 
of a fundamental substance) does not make this 
unity visible. One infers to this unity from a 
premise that it is accessible to us only remotely 
through its differentiation and particularization 
in the course of time. It is not difficult to see that 
such an attempt to pronounce on the underlying 
unity of the universe is reminiscent of the ancient 
ambitions to claim that the substance of the world, 
i.e. the universals of the world, are in water, fire, 
apeiron etc.7 Cosmology silently follows the same 
route of thought by postulating such a primordial 
substance at the beginning of the universe which 
is ultimately responsible for the variety of objects 
available in the cosmic display. However, here, 
there is a seeming difference with an ancient 
view: water of Thales or apeiron of Heraclitus 
were abstract notions but allegedly co-existing 
with the empirical display of the world. In this 
sense one could say that there were no temporal 
extensions within these substances. In a rather 
contemporary way of saying water and apeiron 
could correspond to a microscopic level of reality, 
but here and now so that there is no evolutional 
extension between universals and their empirical 
incarnations. Unlike this physical cosmology 
places the undifferentiated substance of the 
Big Bang in the past universe, assuming that 
there is a time-like extension in this substance 
which ultimately leads to the present display of 
the universe (there is a more radical assertion: 
whatever direction we observe deeper and deeper 
in the sky, we ultimately observe the Big Bang). 
Thus the difference between mythological and 
contemporary view of the world in terms of 
universals is related to the treatment of extension 
inherent in the underlying substance: spatial 
(in ancient cosmology) versus temporal (in a 
modern one). However, such a perception of 
the difference comes from a scientifically based 
conviction that when one looks at the sky of the 
universe one looks at its remote spatially and 
temporally extended past. This is simply implied 
by causality based in the finitude of the speed of 
propagation of light in the universe. But, and this 
is important, since the size of the visible universe 
is decreasing if one looks backward in time (due 
to its reversed expansion), one can also say that by 
“looking” (not optically, for light could not travel 
before the universe cooled down and split from 
matter) at the Big Bang we are “looking” (that is, 
are making insights) deeply in space (that is into 
the microscopic scales of space as we do through 
microscopes or in experiments in nuclear physics). 
In other words, one can say that a frozen display 
of the universe represents a geometrized passage 
of time. In this sense one can further conjecture 
that what is called the evolution of the universe in 
time from the initial Big Bang is effectively the 
unrolling of the universe through different scales 
in space (one must pay attention to the fact that 
this unrolling is driven by dynamical laws which 
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do not contain any intrinsic historicity, so that this 
unrolling is rather to be called not evolution but 
dynamic development determined by the initial 
conditions).
If the idea of the undifferentiated substance is 
laid in the foundation of the visible universe, then 
the problem becomes of how to explain in general 
the process of differentiation in the universe, that 
is generation of basic elements and structural units 
which form varieties of things in the universe. 
Still this would not help too much in terms of 
individual contingent things. By understanding 
that individual things are not subject to scientific 
descriptions cosmology intends to get rid of 
this individuality at all by saying that what is 
really interesting is to understand how a class 
of impersonal objects emerged from something 
undifferentiated and homogeneous. One speaks 
here not of contingent individual exemplar 
objects/beings, but of species of objects unified 
through realised physical forces (for example not 
of this or that galaxy, but of galaxy in general; not 
of this or that planet, but planets in general; not of 
this or that human person, but of human beings 
in general). 
Cosmology uses the language of evolution 
in time in order to put the question about the 
origins of the variety of the astronomical 
display in the shadow of the non-observable, but 
imaginable and well believed “past”, so that the 
primordial substance plays a role of the sought 
“mother”8 of all differentiated things in the 
empirical world evolved through the series of 
cosmic transitions to its present state where we 
have this world amazing in colours and shapes. 
The idea of the Big Bang, as the idiosyncratic 
state of the universe in its asymptotically 
distinct past in which nothing was similar to that 
with which we deal in physics, is considered as 
the prototype, as the seed of all possible things 
in the universe which develop from this Big 
Bang. The problem, however, is that even if we 
describe the Big Bang in terms of a physical state 
which has been mathematically constructed as a 
backward in time extrapolation of what we have 
in the universe now, the Big Bang turns out to be 
merely a very clever disguise of that which we 
experience as the now of the universe. 
Indeed, in the hypothesis of the Big Bang, the 
contingent facticity of the universe as it is observed 
here and now is reinterpreted in terms of a certain 
temporal origin in which the undifferentiated 
“substance” was “set up” in such a state as to 
evolve into the visible universe. The procedure 
of “naming” this initial state is supposed to play 
the role of disclosing the universe’s identity and 
hence acts in thought as a disguised name of its 
present day displayed facticity. It is not difficult 
to comprehend, however, that the problem of 
contingent facticity of the universe can only be 
explained away by this type of reasoning through 
referring to the initial conditions, because there is 
no way to explain the contingent facticity of these 
initial conditions themselves. 
Indeed, since every cosmologist works 
under the assumption that there is continuous 
physical causation in the universe, so that there is 
a chain of causal explanations of what happened 
in the universe if we extrapolate its behaviour 
backward in time, it is not difficult to realise 
that the equations which drive the universe 
backward in time, in fact, effectively encode the 
variety of existing objects in the spatial display 
in the astronomical universe into the same 
variety extrapolated backward in time, which is 
now treated as the “initial” condition for those 
physical states from which it has been backwardly 
constructed. However any hypotheses of the 
facticity of these initial conditions in the universe 
remain no more than hypotheses with no chance 
of their instatement to the status of laws of these 
conditions, because one cannot transcend the 
universe and these very initial conditions. Being 
hypothetical these initial physical conditions of 
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the universe acquire some particular imagery in 
different models. 
Let us discuss an example of such an imagery 
presented in a famous idea of S. Hawking that the 
universe in the so called past was in a quantum 
state and did not have any point of origination. 
The universe was in a space-like state where all 
temporality, associated with the flux of time and 
irreversibility, was suspended.9 This idea was a 
counter-reaction to the representation of the space-
time structure of the early universe as a curvilinear 
cone, with an apex which is usually associated 
with the Big Bang.10 In this representation the 
universe has a boundary as its temporal origin 
whose nature cannot be accounted by the physics 
which is suitable for the interior of the cone. 
In other words, the initial conditions at the Big 
Bang are not subject to the laws of physics within 
the universe and therefore some meta-physical 
assumptions must be made on the nature of their 
contingent facticity. This “incompleteness” of 
physics which requires philosophical inputs has 
been recognised by physicists themselves and 
was the leading motif for Hawking to remove it by 
suggesting sophisticated theories of how to avoid 
temporal origin in cosmology at all. This has been 
done by Hawking through a mathematical trick 
of replacing the temporal variable in equation 
for the wave function of the universe (which is 
usually associated with the empirical flowing 
time), by an abstract imaginary quantity which 
behaves like space (“imaginary” refers here to 
a special type of complex numbers).”11 The aim 
of this quantum cosmology is to deconstruct 
temporality and to announce that there was 
no time in the early universe; the universe 
did not have a point of temporal origination: 
it just exists endlessly, from eternity. It exists 
as compact four-dimensional space, which is 
however contemplated by human observers 
(time is a figment of imagination, according to 
Hawking) in its “remote consequences” as a 
three-dimensional spatial structure evolving 
in physical time. The universe, mathematically 
described as “quantum”, is experienced by us as 
its “classical” projection. The temporal original 
boundary of the universe is removed: thus there 
is nothing beyond the universe either in terms of 
space or time; correspondingly there is no need to 
appeal to any trans-worldly factors responsible for 
the facticity of the universe so that the universe 
is fully graspable by the human intellect which 
in this case is just isomorphic to it.12 Certainly 
this type of scenario is fundamentally untestable 
if this testability is understood in the manner of 
the principle of correspondence with empirical 
evidence. One could raise a question as to whether 
the mathematical beauty of this theory and its 
intrinsic coherence13, as an explanatory device, 
could provide a justification for this model to 
reflect “truth”. However, scientists (as well as 
philosophers and theologians) were very much 
influenced by this model of the universe, because, 
in a way, the issue of contingency of its temporal 
creation (not creation in a sense of ex nihilo) was 
“explained away” whereas the facticity of the 
very “initial conditions” of the universe described 
through the “non-boundary” definition, or in 
terms of pre-existing Euclidian space, was not 
addressed and cannot be addressed at all.14 
Assessing the Hawking’s model 
philosophically one can suggest only two 
interpretations: either his scenario is purely 
Platonic, reproducing an ancient model of the 
frozen time or eternity, and, correspondingly, 
ordinary time as an image of this eternity15, 
so that the quantum universe and its wave 
function represent an intelligible “substance” 
with no relation to physical reality whatsoever, 
or alternatively, it provides us with a new 
incarnation of the old Greek idea of substance 
(the wave function of the universe is this 
substance) which lies in the foundation of all 
possible differentiations among objects. In this 
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latter case the appeal to the “past” of the universe 
corresponding to its quantum stage does not have 
any sense for the universe described by Hawking; 
as having no boundaries and no temporal flux 
it cannot have any “past”: past arises only as a 
figment of imagination). The question then is not 
about the temporal origin or origination of the 
universe, but about its originary foundation, that 
is the foundation of its facticity as having nothing 
to do with its alleged origination in physical time. 
Correspondingly the evolution of the universe 
has an absolutely different sense: it reflects not so 
much physical processes as if they had taken place 
in the past, but as a temporal representation of 
the underlying structure of the observed display 
of the universe by means of intersubjective 
temporality which in turn originates in internal 
time-consciousness. According to Hawking this 
temporal representation is physically initiated by a 
transition from a quantum state of the universe to 
its present empirically contemplated condition.
Another model of the initial conditions 
is based on a famous conjecture of R. Penrose 
about the low-entropy condition at the Big Bang, 
which is responsible for the observed display and 
irreversibility of processes in the universe.16 His 
scenario is Platonically oriented, for in order to 
interpret the specificity of the initial conditions 
in our universe (and hence its facticity), Penrose 
makes his inference from the fundamentally non-
observable but conceptually existing ensemble of 
universes with different initial conditions. This 
hypothesis has some resemblance to the widely 
discussed concept of the multiverse as a new 
incarnation of the perennial issue of plurality of 
worlds. The choice of a particular initial condition 
corresponding to our universe in Penrose’s model 
is made by a hypothetical mechanism, interpreted 
by him as “creator’s ” choice.17 This kind of 
“explanation” creates a feeling of satisfaction in 
some scientists that the observed facticity of the 
universe, in its intrinsic contingency, is explained 
away and referred to the realm of intelligible 
necessity of the plurality of the universes. 
However this sort of multiverse, being an abstract 
possibility of anything, represents another version 
of the idea of underlying substance similar to that 
of ancient Greeks whose particular empirical 
manifestation is launched by that demiurgic-like 
“creator” who, according to Penrose, pinned down 
an infinitesimal point in the set of all possible 
initial conditions. According to this model the 
ultimate antecedent for the contingent display of 
the actual universe is not the initial condition as 
such, but the intelligible reality of the ensemble 
of all possible universes, which is itself beyond 
time and space. In this sense this ensemble is 
always co-present with our universe as well as 
with our perception of the origin of the universe. 
The origin is meant here not in a temporal sense, 
but as an ultimate cause of this universe, similar 
to the absolutely necessary being which was 
discussed by Kant in his fourth antinomy. In this 
sense any referral to the origin of the universe in 
terms of its “past” again looses its sense. This, so 
called past turns out to be no more than a fiction, 
an abstraction which was deduced in the course of 
a desire to explain away the contingent facticity 
of the present by means of the still contingent 
necessity of the past. 
The Originary Foundation  
of the Universe’s Temporality  
and Consciousness
One can make some generalisations on 
the meaning of the origin of temporality in the 
universe which is invoked in abovementioned 
models of the initial conditions. Cosmology 
makes an assumption that time can be asserted 
through conscious acts as an attribute of the world 
constructed by physics, that is as that type of 
reality which has been in place prior to the human 
embodied intelligence in the universe (the time 
of the universe is asserted as non-lived, abstract 
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time). Then the alleged “origin” (as its originary 
foundation) of physical time is also thought in 
similar naturalistic terms. However this origin 
is obscure not only in physical terms, for physics 
can deal only with the already temporal, it is also 
obscure in the perspective of the intersubjective 
temporality of consciousness itself. Indeed, if 
consciousness is embodied in the elements of 
the universe, any thinking of the origin of the 
universe must implicitly contain hints on how 
to think of the “origin” (originary foundation) 
of consciousness itself and vice versa, that is the 
thinking of the “origin” of consciousness must 
implicitly contains hints on how to think of the 
origin of the universe. 
And here we have to face a simple 
phenomenological fact that consciousness (either 
related to the whole humanity or to an individual) 
cannot deal with its own “origin” for it cannot 
stop the flow of intentionality and thus to make 
an introspection upon itself from a perspective 
of non/pre-consciousness. The temporal flow 
of consciousness is characteristic of the human 
life so that to exit it in order to “find” its 
pre/a/trans-temporal origin is not possible. In 
phenomenological terms, one has no access to 
the phenomenality of one’s own conception or 
birth, that is to one’s coming into existence (as 
internal time-consciousness) from that “non-
existent” which is one’s originary foundation. 
Detached from our originary foundation, the 
characteristic feature of its partial, “a-posteriori”, 
phenomenality is exactly that it does not show 
itself: it is present only as an efficacious origin 
of all states of life. Correspondingly any 
constitution of such an originary state is an act 
in the already existent consciousness, that is in 
the present, in the context of the present. Thus 
the phenomenology of the originary foundation 
can only be established through the constitution 
of this “origin” through acts and insights taking 
place in the present. This raises a question on the 
sense of the reality of a thus constituted “origin”: 
is this “origin” indeed in the temporal antecedents 
belonging to the sphere of the already unconcealed 
(and thus it is indeed the origin par excellence), 
or, vice versa, is this “origin” the hidden name of 
the backwardly extrapolated present, that is the 
name of the “past” as an open-ended constitution 
of its content taking place as a process directed to 
the future from the present? 
It is then not difficult to realise that 
cosmology is doomed to deal with the same 
difficulty of not being able of phenomenalising 
the originary foundation of the universe and 
the source of its temporality. One possible way 
out from this phenomenological difficulty is to 
commit to a form of Platonic realism. If the thus 
asserted “origin” of the universe is treated as no 
more than a construction, that is as belonging 
to the realm of intelligible realities, this would 
not pose any problem, for the “temporal” status 
of such an intelligible entity would take the 
form of the immanent temporality of conscious 
acts which are directed from the present to 
future. The past of the universe as its origin 
would become an ideal whose content would 
be constantly filled in through the movement 
to an uncertain future. In this case one could 
avoid the antinomy-like difficulties of a Kantian 
kind because the past or the origin of the 
universe would be regarded as a material of an 
indefinite development of thought, in particular 
cosmological theory. Correspondingly this 
development as an indefinite advance would 
be devoid of contradictions since no definite 
concept of the past or the originary foundation 
is envisaged at all at any given stage of thought’s 
development. But this treatment of the past or the 
origin of the universe in a platonic-like manner 
would be considered by physical cosmology as 
unsatisfactory, since the latter attempts to build 
its concept of the origin in rubrics of scientific 
objectivity and to treat it as “object”.
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Correspondingly, cosmology affirms that 
the time of the early universe is not an intelligible 
entity, but physical time, so that there is evolution 
of the universe in this time and what we observe 
in the universe here and now is the remote result 
of what had been in the universe long ago when 
the corporeality of subjects was not possible. 
Indeed, that which is remotely observed by the 
senses extended through technology as the frozen 
memory of the processes in the universe, cannot 
be participated in, or lived through, in principle 
because of its incompatibility with the embodied 
intelligence. An observational support, so that we 
see a frozen temporal span of the universe, comes 
from the fact that we see the universe backwardly 
in time along the null past light cone, so that the 
more distant the object we see the more we see 
the past of the universe. However, there is a limit 
to this seeing predicted by cosmology and based 
on the empirical evidence of the microwave 
background radiation pointing to the fact that 
the universe was not transparent to light before 
the so called decoupling of matter from radiation 
took place. Whatever properties of physical 
matter of the universe prior to this temporal limit 
cosmology predicates, including the very cosmic 
time, they are not observable in principle so that 
the nature of realistic commitment with respect 
to its theories is rather uncertain. Temporality 
and the constituted reality of these so called dark 
ages of the universe has a very limited and formal 
mathematical character to which no intuition 
corresponds: time is introduced in equations as 
a fictitious parameter incapable of any direct 
physical verification and thus has a relation to 
the physical non-lived time only within a belief-
based ontological commitment. 
As to the “origin” of the universe, what 
is happening in this type of reasoning is that 
human consciousness projects instinctively the 
intuition about the finite origin of this same 
consciousness (as posited in the immanent time 
of this consciousness), onto the outer world, the 
universe as if this universe existed long before 
the human presence was possible. It is interesting 
that warnings on the contradictory nature of such 
simple parallels have been made long before by 
G. Marcel: “We have to give up the illusion by 
which we compare the world to a person whose 
past (so it seems) can be completely realised. …
[I]f it is possible for us to “realise” a person’s past, 
that is because in an arbitrary way we envisage a 
discontinuous section of the “becoming”, a section 
in reality bound up absolutely continuously with 
all the becoming that went before; we realise the 
past in question because we are only considering 
a fiction. And hence we should never view the 
world’s past under the aspect of datum – for 
under this aspect it is inevitably contradictory 
and unthinkable. We should only regard it as the 
material of an infinite rational development (a 
development conceived as potential and future 
and hence not contradictory).”18 
Indeed, when cosmology predicates things 
of the universe, or the universe as a whole as 
an “object” being out there independently of a 
subjectivity which articulates the universe, it 
exercises itself in what phenomenology calls 
the natural attitude of consciousness. In this 
case the present state of the universe, as well 
as its theoretical past, are treated as equal on 
objective, but distinct, physical references of 
cosmological theories. If the attitude changes 
towards the philosophical, that is, past and present 
are seen from the point of view of generating 
consciousness, there is a certain equivalence 
between “the past” and “the present”, but the 
equivalence not of an objectivistic commitment 
with respect to them, but such that  they are 
both being constituted. While within the natural 
attitude there is a temporal evolution of the 
universe and hence there must be an asymmetry 
between the universe’s past and its present, from 
a phenomenological point of view the situation is 
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not so clear, because the intuition of “the past” 
(as having existed prior to any consciousness) 
is exercised in the present of consciousness of 
a cosmologist. In other words, “the past” of the 
universe represents an intentional correlate of the 
multiplicity of conscious acts of cosmologists at 
their immediately given “present”19. In this case 
the posited causality between different states of 
the universe appears to be a projection of that 
immediately experienced temporality of internal 
states of consciousness or thematised historicity 
which enters the rubrics of consciousness. 
“The past” which forms a part of the event of 
any perception and any given present, as a pre-
predicative experience of the present, enters the 
horizon of all meanings in all thematizations of 
the world and, in particular, the physical universe. 
But in this case as pre-predicative experience, 
open to an indefinite constitution the “past” 
ceases to function under the aspect of datum. 
The past reveals itself as an originary intuition 
of the hidden antecedent of that state of affairs 
which humanity experiences in its developed, 
adult stage. If the universe is still presented 
under the aspect of datum, it makes irrelevant 
and impossible any questioning on the sense of 
humanity in the universe. As was eloquently 
expressed by G. Marcel long before scientific 
cosmology took its turn: “[M]ore I insist on the 
objectivity of things, cutting off the umbilical 
cord which links them with my existence, that 
one which I call my organo-physical presence in 
me, more I affirm the independence of the world 
with respect to my I, its radical indifference to my 
destiny, my goals, more the world thus proclaimed 
as the only real, would convert into an illusion, 
a documentary produced for my curiosity, but 
which in the long run self-annihilates by a simple 
fact that it ignores me. I mean that the universe 
tends to disappear to the extent it overwhelms me. 
And this, I believe, is that which is forgotten every 
time one attempts to crush man by the weight of 
astronomical facts.”20 From here one can draw the 
conclusion that any attempt to make cosmology 
existential and relevant for the elucidation of 
the sense of humanity implies only one possible 
strategy: the universe must not be considered as 
an object. But if it is not an object, it becomes a 
constitutive part of an existential event. What is 
the meaning of this paradoxical statement that the 
universe is “an” event or “the” event?
Eventuality of the Universe Because  
of Inconceivability of its Origin
By its definition as a wholeness with nothing 
beyond it, the universe cannot be subjected to 
the relational analysis because it is unique and 
one cannot rerun the universe or stage it as a 
physical “event” in a space of possibilities: in 
this sense the universe as a whole is identical 
only to itself, so that its unfolding facticity to 
reflective consciousness is characterised not only 
by irreproducibility, but, what is more important, 
by logical irreversibility as a coming into the 
facticity of one’s existence. The phenomenality of 
the universe is its sheer givenness, which does not 
arise from our initiative and does not respond to 
our expectations (since it cannot be reproduced). 
It gives itself to us from its own self to such an 
extent that it affects us, changes us and almost 
constitutes us. In this sense we cannot stage the 
universe: vice versa it stages us out of its own 
giving itself to us. 
The universe seems to be already there 
available for our arrival, life in it and to be 
gazed at. In this sense the universe imposes 
itself on us as preceding us, being without us 
even as it is adjusted to accommodate us. It 
appears to our view in childhood as well in an 
adult state as an unexpected, unpredictable fact, 
originating allegedly in what we perceive as 
the uncontrollable past. Supplied by theoretical 
apparatus, we indeed face the entire cosmos in its 
past and this past is not reachable by us apart from 
– 183 –
Alexei V. Nesteruk. The Origin of the Universe and Event of Birth: Phenomenological Parallels
deductions and intuitions. The more we study the 
universe astronomically, the more splendour we 
unfold; but this splendour itself is unexpected 
and unpredictable, unknown before we caught its 
glimpse in the sky. The “beauty” of the universe 
as it manifests itself through picturesque galaxies 
and nebula formations brings one to a state of 
awe when this one experiences the universe as 
incomparable and incommensurable with any 
particular event in one’s life. The universe comes 
to me, engulfs and imposes itself upon me without 
my control and anticipation: thus its coming 
into existence in me testifies to the event. Since 
the coming of the universe to one’s life can be 
applied to any human being which ever existed, 
the personal sense of awe and splendour of the 
universe is gradually semantically transferred 
to the sphere of the intersubjective on pages of 
books and others’ impressions. 
Here, from the point of view of a physical 
cosmologist there is an imminent difficulty: how 
can one treat the universe as an event if at first 
glance it is “an” object – the astronomical cosmos 
out there and what is beyond it. What is the basis 
for interpreting the universe as an object of 
cosmological research as “an” or “the” event? In 
order to avoid the futility of such an interrogation 
based on a simple thought that all objects can be 
treated as events, one should reverse this question 
and enquire how the essential event-character 
of phenomena of the universe became blurred 
and disappeared to the extent that it appears 
no more than an object? In other words, what 
happens to the phenomenality of the universe 
when it is reduced to objectivity? The objectivity 
of the phenomenon of the universe arises from 
an attempted quantitative synthesis in the style 
of Kant: to become an object any phenomenon 
should be expressed in terms of quantity or 
magnitude. Correspondingly the totality of the 
phenomenon is achieved as the sum of its parts 
through anticipation of a quantitative synthesis 
(Critique of Pure Reason, A163; B204). This 
signifies that the “magnitude of the phenomenon 
of the universe” (achieved on the basis of 
“summation” of astronomical objects) is always 
to be modelled in finite parameters and depicted 
in physically real or imaginary space.21 In this 
sense the universe as a whole is foreseen before 
it is actually seen. The universe is confined 
in its quantity, defined through its parts and 
brought to a conceptual halt by the already made 
measurements. This reduction of the universe to 
its foreseeable quantity turns it into an object as 
if there were nothing else to be seen in it, nothing 
other than that which can already be envisaged on 
the basis of its theoretical construction, which is 
particularly typical for theoretical cosmologists 
who no longer need to see the universe (that 
is commune with it personally) because they 
foresee the universe in advance. In fact, a 
speculative cosmology could freely avoid any 
living insight in the universe on the basis of its 
theoretical foreseeing unless the measurements 
were to contradict this foreseeing, that is bring 
the constructed object to its breakdown.22 The 
phenomenon of the universe reduced to an object 
deprives the universe of its independent and 
unrestricted appearance, placing thus its event-
like characteristic in the rubrics of some common 
laws.23 When cosmology treats the universe as an 
object it is assumed that everything in it remains 
seen in advance and nothing unexpected can 
happen which disqualify the universe from the 
status of an object. In this sense the universe as 
an object of particular theoretical study remains a 
phenomenon which has expired: nothing new can 
happen to it, since in those rubrics in which it is 
constituted it appears as that which is devoid of the 
mode of becoming or happening. Metaphorically 
one can say that the universe as object appears as 
the shadow of the event which is denied in it. 
The universe as event cannot be foreseen 
since its partial causes which are invented by 
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cosmology remain fundamentally insufficient: 
a typical example is a particular version of 
the multiverse theory in which the space of 
all possible initial conditions for universes is 
postulated. This ensemble of the initial conditions 
is a necessary condition for this universe to be 
actualised in existence. However the realised 
facticity of this universe as the pinning down of 
the initial conditions which lead to the formation 
of our universe is not described by any theory 
and requires ad extra assumptions which do 
not belong to the sphere of physical causality. 
The realisation of these conditions is detected 
post-factum, when the event, that is the realised 
facticity of the universe, happened and was 
accomplished. But the event of choosing the 
appropriate initial conditions in this case is not 
subject to any causation based in the foreseeing 
of this event. It is not amazing that the possibility 
of these initial conditions which are impossible to 
foresee, remains strictly speaking, an impossibility 
with regard to the system of previously classified 
causes: indeed the choice of the initial conditions 
for our universe is practically impossible since 
it must be made from the potentially infinite 
number of all possible conditions. 
In a different language the observation that 
the universe as a whole, as an event, cannot be 
foreseen on the grounds of any causation and 
hence testifies to an event can be rephrased 
as: the universe imposes itself on perception 
without one being able to assign to it a substance 
in which it dwells as an accident (or, as we 
said above, a cause from which it results as an 
effect). One could refer to the invisible whole 
of the universe as that substance “in” which the 
observable part of the universe (as its accident) 
dwells. The universe is given to us in its pieces 
and moments which represent the whole which 
will never be accessible per se. The invocation 
of the substance in this context would just mean 
a conviction that there is an undifferentiated 
unity of “all in all” and that the visible universe 
represents its particular incarnation. Once again, 
the visible universe, as an accident, “indwells in 
substance” which, in this case, is a mere mental 
abstraction. This mental split in representation of 
the universe as substance and accident does not 
correspond however to the immediate experience 
of the universe in the event of one’s life, for it is in 
this event that it is exactly impossible to make a 
distinction between “substance” of life and life as 
an “accident”. Correspondingly it is problematic 
to look for the cause of the universe (as effect) if 
it is perceived as coaevus universum, that is as 
“simultaneous” with one’s life. In other words, 
the question of the facticity of the universe (as an 
effect of some cause) cannot be even addressed 
if the universe is seen as the totality of all. All 
rhetoric about the origination of the universe in 
the Big Bang, as the “cause” of the universe, has 
no philosophical significance, because it does not 
address the issue of the “cause” of the Big Bang 
itself. Even the appeal to the “particular” Big 
Bang taking place, for example, in the course of 
inflationary generation of many bubble universes 
does not reach any goal, since the cause of the 
ensemble of those bubbles indwelling in the 
“substance” of the “inflaton” field does not remove 
the question of the facticity of this field. Indeed, 
in analogy with ancient Greek philosophies this 
field can be considered as substance of the same 
mental kind as “water” of Thales from Miletus 
from which the actual state of affairs in the world 
can be produced by potentially infinite ways. 
One particular characteristic of the universe as 
an event amounts to the fact that the numbers of 
possible explanations of its facticity is indefinite 
and increases in proportion to the cosmological 
hermeneutics that cosmologists and their 
interpreters produce. 
The assertion of the universe as a whole as an 
event does not deny its temporality (understood 
in cosmology as the universe’s evolving in 
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time): in fact, the temporality of the universe as 
a whole cannot be that of the physical flow of 
pre-existing time, it is a different temporality 
of an event which must be elucidated. In order 
to do this let us start from a simple question: if 
the phenomenon of the universe giving itself in a 
mode of an event carries the signs of temporality, 
does it testify to the fact that the universe as a 
whole reaffirms the Kantian position that every 
phenomenon is a phenomenon if it admits a 
representation as experience in time-form of 
sensibility? The response to this is that while in 
Kant’s view temporality serves only to allow the 
synthesis of phenomena as object with a certain 
identity, that is a guarantee of its permanence 
in presence justified through assigning it a 
cause or a reason, the event-like character of the 
universe as a whole cannot rely on this kind of 
a synthesis and thus permits a corresponding 
phenomenality of the universe contrary to the 
objectivity established in physical cosmology. 
The objectiveness of the universe as permanence 
in presence through its evolution becomes a sort 
of projection or even an illusion of an a-temporal 
event. The universe as an evolving object being 
described by mathematical laws, which empty 
the notion of the universe of any intuitive content, 
represents in this case a shadow of an event which 
gives itself as that which is given to us with the 
very fact of life. But then there is a question of 
the internal sense of the temporality of life itself. 
Indeed temporality belongs to the sensibility of 
subjects articulating the universe and orienting 
them towards the synthesis of already given 
objects. However, it is this same temporality 
(which masters the objective) that is never applied 
in order to constitute and define the operator of 
this synthesis, that is the transcendental “I”. Then, 
if one conjectures that phenomena temporalized 
as objects (the evolving universe) preserve a trace 
of being an event (an intuition of the universe 
as a whole) still the transcendental “I” does not 
phenomenalise itself as an event. This happens 
because the “I” never phenomenalises itself at all: 
it does not appear among other phenomena, that 
is it is excluded from that phenomenality which it 
produces. In this sense the idea that the universe 
as a whole is an event seems to be counter-
intuitive: indeed even if the “I” experience 
their communion with the universe through the 
a-temporal, that is a non-temporalisable sense of 
belonging and consubstantiality, any attempt to 
express this linguistically and discursively again 
puts the event-like sense of communion under 
the rubrics of eidetic temporality. However, there 
is one particular aspect of temporalizing the 
universe according to the phenomenality of objects 
which breaks with the poor intuitive donation of 
the universe and which inevitably leads to the 
invocation of the sense of an event, namely the 
universe’s “beginning”, its point of origination, 
that which in cosmology is called the Big Bang. 
It is here that the universe is explicitly eidetically 
temporalized as an event. And this happens 
not accidentally, but because of a deep analogy 
between the Big Bang (as a shorthand notation 
for the boundary of the universe) and an event of 
birth of any particular “I” which is the ultimate 
beginning and end of all possible predications 
of life as well as the universe. It is here that the 
“I” phenomenalises the universe as an event on 
the same grounds as it phenomenalises itself as 
an event of birth. In other words the universe 
receives its eidetic event-like temporalisation 
because the “I” as a subject of its disclosure 
and manifestation phenomenalises itself only 
according to the unique event-like character of its 
birth. 
When cosmology tells us that whatever we 
see in the sky points towards the origin of the 
universe, the Big Bang, it asserts the universe as 
a phenomenon which shows itself in the mode 
of the already given to us in its sheer facticity 
as originating from this Big Bang. Such a 
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phenomenon of the universe is properly event-like. 
The question then is how to understand the origin 
of the universe showing itself as a phenomenon in 
the conditions where human subjects have never 
seen it by their own eyes. Correspondingly in order 
to “re-constitute” it (that is to constitute) one must 
rely on intermediate deductions following from 
observations and belief laden theories. If we make 
a purely speculative assumption that humanity is 
the only intelligent agency in the universe, then 
though the origination of the universe definitely 
takes place without human presence and perhaps 
before it, it should not be able to show itself to 
anybody other than human race. Cosmologists 
still consider it as a phenomenon because they 
constantly intend it: they want to know where 
the universe they live in comes from and what 
is its distinctive identity correlating with the fact 
of the human presence in it. These intentions 
are fulfilled with indirect testimonies and quasi-
intuitions which, as we will see below have a 
psychological origin related to the anxiety of 
finding an impersonal but universal foundation 
for the facticity of existence.
The origin of the universe which contains 
human beings appears in fact a privileged 
phenomenon since a significant effort of humanity 
is devoted to its reconstitution as restoration 
of the lost memory of it, to giving it sense and 
even in a way responding to its appeal to us (as 
if the universe had its distinctive self-identity). 
Still, humanity cannot see this undeniable and 
unavoidable phenomenon directly: Gabriel Marcel 
expressed this explicitly: “I cannot really stand 
aside from the universe, even in thought. Only by 
a meaningless pretence can I place myself at some 
vague point outside it, and from thence reproduce 
on a small scale the successive stages of its 
genesis.”24 The fact that one cannot see the origin 
of the universe directly and that nevertheless it 
reveals itself as a phenomenon which cosmology 
constantly intends, constitutes an aporia which 
can be formally formulated in the following way: 
the origin of the universe shows to humanity 
precisely that its origin cannot be shown. This 
aporia urges a philosophical cosmologist to 
understand how a phenomenon that does not show 
itself directly (for indirectly the beginning of the 
universe is shown in its present facticity) not only 
affects humanity as if it did show itself, but, in 
fact, affects humanity in a more radical way that 
any other phenomena, since the beginning of 
the universe forms the necessary conditions for 
humanity’s emergence in the universe, defines 
this humanity physically and biologically and 
even as conscious subjects. Such a cosmologist 
has to admit that since this indemonstrable origin 
of the universe reveals itself to him, it “happens” 
to him in that it endows the universe and hence 
human beings with a future. The origin of the 
universe cannot be qualified as a phenomenon 
in an ordinary sense because of its presence in 
absence, that is inability of any demonstration. 
However, it phenomenalises itself, that is, comes 
to pass in human life as an event, which was never 
present in presence, and is always already gone 
past, whereas never surpasses the present and, in 
fact, is always to come. 
Thus one can say that the origin of the 
universe phenomenalises itself but as a pure 
event, that is, as unpredictable (there is no sense 
of temporality before the universe), irreproducible 
(one cannot rerun the universe), exceeding all 
cause (there is no physical causation beyond the 
universe) and making the impossible possible 
(the probability of origination of our universe 
in multiverse scenarios is always infinitely 
small, that is the universe is a-priori impossible), 
surpassing all expectations and predictions (the 
constant advance of knowledge of the universe 
does not make it possible to assign to the universe 
some definitive and stable features which could 
sustain indefinitely the observational tests25). 
Speaking of the origin of the universe we speak 
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of its donation: it is given to us in the measure 
it gives of itself and its givenness to us is an 
apodictic fact-event which alone is responsible 
for that which we call the phenomenon of the 
origin of the universe, or the universe as a whole. 
It is this givenness that initiates the encapsulated 
temporality of an event, which being projected 
onto the object-like temporality acquires the 
features of a shadow of the universe’s wholeness 
and its non-originary origin.
Identity of the Universe:  
That Which Gives Itself  
and That Which is Being Given
Since the universe gives itself, one can 
legitimately asks for the elucidation of the sense 
of “who” or “what” is that which gives itself, 
or whether one can assign some identity to it. 
Theoretical cosmology has to work in conditions 
where its subject matter, i.e. the universe as a 
whole (as a name of this identity) is not available 
to a scientist in a way similar to identities of 
other empirical things. For an ordinary object its 
identity is formed through the object’s presence 
and absence to a particular consciousness, so that 
the object appears in its identity as the unity of 
its profiles and impressions available to the public 
mind. One particular feature of constituting 
identity is that it can be formed through 
consciousness of its sheer absence, that is, its 
non-existence. For example, while experiencing 
the beauty of a flower one appreciates it without 
clear understanding as to why it was created and 
who could appreciate it if anyone would not be 
there. Thus the very identity of this flower enters 
our consciousness either from the perspective 
of its possible non-existence or in terms of our 
non-existence. The same is true with respect to 
another human being. The anticipation of the 
identity of the other constitutes one’s own identity 
as radically distinct and different from this other. 
The disappearance of the other from the horizon 
of one’s life thus affects one’s own identity as 
being linked to that one which has disappeared. 
However, unlike physical objects, it is extremely 
difficult to achieve a clear consciousness of one’s 
own absence for itself, that is, non-existence of 
oneself for itself. In spite of the fact that the very 
intending of this strange condition is intrinsically 
contradictory it cannot be entirely empty since 
it is still exercised from within the presence of 
one’s subjectivity. A similar thing happens in 
cosmological thought, where any attempt to think 
of the universe as non-existent is contradictory, for 
it eliminates that same incarnate consciousness 
which thinks of the universe. Thus the sheer 
impossibility of non-existence of the universe 
and the impossibility of non-existence of that 
thinking self which thinks the universe at this 
very moment, invokes the sense of the universe’s 
identity as that which is unavoidably given. 
Correspondingly the status of this identity as 
indemonstrable follows from the fact that the very 
existence of ego, its uniqueness as a hypostatic 
incarnation (birth) cannot be phenomenalised in 
the manner of ordinary objects. The identity of 
the universe as that which gives itself, cannot be 
phenomenalised in the manner of ordinary objects 
because the existential impossibility of its non-
existence precludes its apprehension as an object. 
Thus the identity of the universe originates from 
the universe which gives itself in such a way that 
it does not show itself, but affects the thinking 
self to the extent that the whole content of its life 
is determined and produced by the universe. 
One can reverse the latter thought and assert 
that from a human perspective it is the sense of 
identity of the ego, resulting from its hypostatic 
(that is personal) propensity, which determines 
the sense of identity of the universe. This reversal 
has not only an eidetic character: it is based in 
the fact that subjectivity attempts to constitute its 
own identity by constant appealing to its special 
origin in that unique event of human coming-
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into-being, that is its birth. But birth as an event 
which precedes the ego (since the ego cannot 
have access to its own birth because it could 
not have existed yet) can be considered either as 
having no origin at all, that is its facticity has an 
existential absoluteness and one cannot establish 
any reference to anything in the world as its 
antecedent, or it can be considered as being a 
step in a chain of transformations in the universe 
so that its ultimate physical antecedent can be 
traced back to the very “origin” (whatever this 
may mean) of the universe. In the latter case the 
anxiety of birth is extrapolated heroically into the 
indemonstrable mystery of origination of all in an 
event similar to that of an individual birth, but 
at the scale of the whole universe. In this vision 
the quest for the identity of the universe reveals 
itself not so much as a cosmological category, but 
rather an existential one, proceeding from the 
sheer sense of personal, self-identical existence 
which naturally personalises all of that being 
which gives itself in the fact of this particular 
existence.
Thus the very sense of the identity of the 
universe originates in human beings contemplating 
it through communion and participation, as an 
immediate and direct experience of belonging 
to and unity with the universe. This communion 
is drastically different in comparison with the 
rational cognition of the universe in scientific 
cosmology which considers the universe as 
a composite of different eras, domains and 
ingredients, that is as a structured and complex 
system which in its spatial and temporal vastness 
dominates with the realms of the non-human.26 
One can characterise the identity of the universe, 
that is of that which gives itself, as an eidetic 
expression of our communion with the universe, 
that is a personal response to the gift of the 
universe in the gift of life. The identity of the 
universe emerges as a mental projection of that 
experienced permanence-in-presence of the field 
of the living consciousness in the background 
of which all moments and pieces of the universe 
are articulated. Expressed in the natural attitude 
the presence of the identity of the universe in 
human consciousness reflects the incarnate 
consubstantiality of all multi-personal humanity to 
the universe. It is this multi-personality as unique 
events of birth that represents the difficulty for 
science: it cannot deal with individual histories 
and temporalities related to personal birth and 
corresponding image of this birth, implanted in 
the personalised sense of identity of the universe. 
Therefore cosmology avoids this multihypostatic 
identity of the universe originating in different 
birth-events by reducing their varieties to a kind of 
objective although inter-personal, representation. 
This is what is exactly attempted in Big Bang 
cosmology which represents a form of impersonal 
appropriation of the universe by an anonymous 
transcendental consciousness stripped of any 
trace of its originality in events of birth. 
For example, the “cosmological principle” 
is the central stance of the Big Bang cosmology, 
which postulates the uniformity of the universe 
in space. It asserts the universe from a pluralistic 
perspective as if one could reposition oneself 
from one location to another and see the universe 
in the same pattern as we see it from the earth. 
The ego exercises its ability to displace itself 
in an intelligible space in order to stretch its 
consciousness across the whole universe, which is 
“seen” not only as an intelligible entity but also as 
the intelligent entity (for example, as a multiplicity 
of potentially possible but undifferentiated 
observers). However, this displacement implies 
the loss of personality linked to events of unique 
birth, because this extended cosmic intelligence 
functions as disembodied and anonymous. The 
sought identity of the universe in this case is 
“present” as a banal intuition of the uniformity of 
all spatial pieces and ages of the universe, as the 
sameness of the hypothetical cosmic view of the 
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universe by all possible observers. Under these 
assumptions, some cosmological theories pretend 
to model and give an “image” to this identity. For 
example, if the universe is thought to be closed 
and finite in space and time, it is depicted as a 
curvilinear cylinder with two apexes symbolising 
Big Bang and Big Crunch.27 It is in this act of 
creative imagination that the universe acquires 
a kind of non-person-related identity associated 
with that anonymous cosmological consciousness 
which has “created” it: the identity of an image is 
supposed to originate in the identity of “an artist” 
who produced this image. 
The universe thought by cosmologists 
as something out there does not have its own 
hypostasis, hence it seems inconceivable that the 
identity of the universe can be disclosed solely 
as a movement of donation of the universe. The 
spelling out of this identity originates in humanity 
as a response to this movement in form of 
appropriation of this gift. It is because of this that 
sometimes humanity is treated as the hypostasis 
of the universe and its voice28 (or, as Heidegger 
would say, the shepherd of being), that is as 
those agencies who in response to the universe’s 
donation explore and articulate it, give names to 
it by attempting to bring to presence the hidden 
identity of the universe. To bring to presence does 
not mean that the sought identity acquires any 
hypostatic features. However, one cannot exclude 
that cosmological research, as human activity, 
forms the idea of the identity of the universe 
in a “quasi-hypostatic” sense, when the urge 
for research becomes an interaction with a yet 
unknown and fundamentally open-ended “being”, 
which while giving itself to a cosmologist through 
a multitude of appearances, withdraws itself from 
any possibility of demonstration (unpredictable, 
unexpected ultimately unknowable). Here 
an analogy with a philosophical approach to 
personhood will be appropriate: in the same way 
as any other human person (as a modus of unique 
and incommunicable being) cannot be known by 
using syllogistic faculties of the thinking self29, 
the universe cannot be known by means of simple 
observation, analysis and theorising. Then, seen 
from a philosophical perspective, a theoretical 
exploration of the universe (articulation as an 
object) can be interpreted as a vain attempt to 
investigate by means of discursive thinking 
another para-hypostatic being. In this case the 
fundamental irreducibility of a para-hypostatic 
being to its “pieces” and “moments” makes the 
cosmological enterprise a fundamentally open-
ended, that is apophatic enterprise, similar to that 
aspiration of humanity to establish the sense of 
its own identity through grasping the sense of 
an event of physical birth whose phenomenality 
endows humanity with a future. 
Phenomenology of Birth
The problem is that in analogy with the Big 
Bang which cannot be seen but only experienced 
in its delayed consequences, I have not seen my 
birth and I must rely on the account of my parents 
or other witnesses in order to attempt to grasp my 
birth as that occurrence which affects me through 
all my life, but I will never be able to reconstitute 
this event as a phenomenon. The phenomenon of 
birth gives itself without showing itself because 
it comes to pass as an event, that is something 
without foundation, ground, as origin but which 
is non-originary.30 The exceptional and unique 
status of this event follows from the fact that 
birth gives itself together with that, that it gives 
me to myself. This is a mechanism how my birth 
phenomenalises itself, for without this giving me 
to myself I would not be able to realise that it is 
me who is affected by birth. The phenomenon 
of birth thus exemplifies the condition for any 
phenomenon: the possibility of phenomenalisation 
of something lies in the extent by which it gives 
itself. In this sense the phenomenon of birth is the 
first phenomenon which initiates the possibility of 
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receiving all other phenomena. The phenomenon 
of birth as a phenomenon par excellence, not 
being reducible to any preceding causes and 
being incommunicable and indemonstrable, 
forms that excess in human perception of life 
which is always allows for unpredictable and 
undescribable future, for an indefinite series 
of commentaries and insights on sense of this 
birth which extends forward in time while being 
treated retrospectively. Not being a phenomenon 
given to myself, I always experience an intention 
to look at birth as a phenomenon which initiated 
me, my identity, my spiritual growth, ultimately 
my hypostatic uniqueness. Birth as an existential 
premise is always silently encoded in all my 
actions, which attempt to reconstitute it in order 
to come to terms with the fact that I was born 
without my consent and can do nothing about 
it. In a way, my birth can be seen as the never-
ending continuation of my experience of life, 
but it is still inaccessible as a phenomenon to 
my direct gaze. My appropriation of birth is an 
unceasing endeavour, which is always delayed. 
It is delayed because any retrospective reflection 
contains as its basic element a condition of a 
delay: delay between the occurrence of my birth 
and innumerable intuitions of its meaning. This 
inability to comprehend my own birth can be 
presented as a paradox: birth shows me exactly 
that my own origin cannot be shown. In this sense 
me as an original being, does not have an originary 
origin, that is a ground to which I can refer in 
order to deduce the occurrence of my birth from 
a chain of worldly events. In fact the very idea 
of the possibility of grounding my birth in the 
chain of worldly events signifies a fundamental 
reduction or deprivation of the phenomenality of 
birth of its excessive primordiality (not deficiency 
but excess). It is exactly because my birth is in 
the foundation of all derivative intentions to 
construct a chain of historical or cosmological 
transformations, which as antecedents would 
conclude in my birth, that all articulations 
are overwhelmed initially and irreducibly by 
the intuition of this incomprehensible and 
indemonstrable event of birth. 
How then can my birth as a phenomenon, 
while not showing itself, affect me radically in 
the sense that it produces my unique existence in 
a particular, contingent, hypostatic incarnation? 
How can the origin of myself, which is present 
in all following events of my life show itself in 
such a way that, effectively, it is indemonstrable? 
The answer to these questions comes from the 
realisation that this showing has an eschatological 
character because the past of my birth is being 
shown to me only through its anticipation (as the 
intention to understand “who I am”) as directed to 
the future. My birth has sense only as an “event” 
which phenomenalises itself by endowing me 
with my indefinite, potential future. Being an 
indemonstrable phenomenon birth reveals itself 
as an “event” that was never present to me in 
orders of “presence in presence” and always 
already imbued with the qualities of the having 
passed, but never irrelevant for the present 
and outdated. But even in this “eschatological 
phenomenalisation” my birth does not allow any 
demonstrability in a sense of communication: 
my birth for me is an event which cannot be 
grasped as a fact and correspondingly described 
in rubrics of thought and demonstrated, being 
irreproducible and surpassing any expectation 
and prediction. By rephrasing a passage from G. 
Marcel’s Metaphysical Journal: I am my birth; I 
am the more my birth the less I treat it simply 
as a collection of events jotted in a notebook as 
possible answers to eventual questions. Does not 
that mean that between my birth and my actual 
experience there is a relation of sympathy, but that 
this relation is closely bound up with the function 
of my body? “Is not this global experience which 
is me, but which far from being capable of 
being objectified is the condition of any possible 
– 191 –
Alexei V. Nesteruk. The Origin of the Universe and Event of Birth: Phenomenological Parallels
objectification, the mediating element which 
alone allows the attention to bear on itself, that 
is to say, allows it to be? And the impossibility 
of defining this past-subject [birth-subject, AN] 
which makes memory possible is only another 
way of expressing the impossibility of treating 
the mediating element as an object and of forming 
an idea of it”.31 Here Marcel establishes a link 
between the event of birth and that which he calls 
incarnation, or in a mundane usage, embodiment. 
This link is important because apart from a 
teleological sense of an event of birth it entails a 
purely material, physical sense related to the very 
conditions, that is a possibility of this birth.
Indeed the event of birth (if we regard it 
to coming-into-being of unique persons) as an 
event is not accountable on the level of sufficient 
conditions of its happening: its outcome is 
unpredictable and unforeseeable: given the normal 
physical conditions birth (conception) might not 
happen at all. However the necessary conditions 
for this event to happen lie in the sphere of what 
preceded it, the physical plan. In this sense in 
spite of its sporadic and unique character an 
event of birth as physical incarnation contains in 
itself that something which made the happening 
of this event possible. And when we say that birth 
gives itself in an unmediated and indemonstrable 
way that is not to say it does not contain in itself 
and thus manifests the hidden conditions for it 
to take place. These conditions come with birth 
and follow birth in the same unmediated and 
indemonstrable way. This means that in no way 
can I treat myself as an absolute beginning. I 
can oversee the limits of my origin and look 
objectively at it, that is to formulate for myself 
the necessary conditions which made it possible. 
In a simple case of a personal family history I 
must admit that my parents were that necessary 
condition which made my appearance possible. 
I did not chose my parents and they are mine 
in an absolute sense. My embodiment links me 
ontologically to them and any refusal of this fact 
could imply an existential suicide. In this sense it is 
me who is ontologically responsible for what they 
have been or what they are. My parents are such 
existents who participate in the very possibility 
of my existence. Thus, with regard to all possible 
outcomes of my relations with them what always 
remains between me and them is piety, irreducible 
unity and unbreakable communion of being. 
But my personal story can easily be extended to 
that “before” which lies in the foundation of my 
incarnation not only on the level of my parents 
as a biological species, but that “before and out 
there” which make it possible for life to exist at 
all. One means the universe. Thus my act of birth 
entails not only an unbreakable communion with 
my parents but an unbreakable communion with 
the universe where I was born and which is an 
implicit premise of my articulations with regard 
to both my birth and the universe as a whole. 
Repeating a previous thought, I did not choose 
the universe where to be born. The universe then 
is mine in an absolute sense. I cannot disregard 
the universe because its presence is implanted in 
my birth: I am in communion with the universe. 
In an incomprehensible way, by being incarnate 
in the universe through my birth, I am personally 
responsible for the universe as it was, it is and it 
will be. The conditions of my birth point to that 
fact that the universe is not entirely alien to me 
and that it sustained the fact of my coming into 
being and in this very fact the universe manifests 
itself as a gift, as that which we receive together 
with a gift of life. 
To summarise, on the one hand the event 
of birth endows us with a future, so that its 
explication goes on continuously as a process 
directed to the future: I am becoming more and 
more my birth through the articulations of its 
efficacious telos; on the one hand the event of 
birth manifests to myself the hidden conditions 
of its very possibility as related to the physical 
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incarnation and these are the physical conditions 
themselves of my birth that receive an articulation 
from within the same efficacious telos related 
to the sufficient conditions of existence of life 
in general which indeed remain a hidden and 
indemonstrable mystery. 
An Example  
from Christian Literature
In order to give a literary illustration of 
some counter-intuitive observations made in 
the phenomenological analysis of birth, let us 
analyse the sense of birth assigned in the history 
of Christian thought and its theology to Jesus 
Christ, considered as an ultimate archetype of 
all humanity and whose incarnation in flesh 
recapitulated all creation. The very fact that we 
still remember the birth-nativity of Christ and that 
this event has ongoing efficaciousness in present 
history of humanity, amounts to its unmediated 
and indemonstrable character accompanied by 
hermeneutics reflected not only in exegetical 
literature, but also in visual art, fiction and 
poetry. In this sense the event of the birth of 
Christ remains a mystery, phenomenologically 
concealed from us, but endowing Christians with 
the future from the movement to which the sense 
of the nativity is unfolded. 
Indeed the apostles and the Church affirmed 
that the Nativity of Christ, apart from its 
occurrence in the earthly history, contained the 
hidden message about the everlasting Kingdom 
which Christ opens to humanity and which 
nobody can close after him (Mt. 2:2, Lk 1:32-33; 
2:11-12). The incarnation of the Logos of God in 
flesh was a manifestation of the end of the one old 
age, and the beginning of the new, the age which 
is driven by the “logic” of the Kingdom of God, 
the age which is eschatological per se. 
There is a hidden dualism in the Christ-
event. On the one hand, in its outward appearance 
as an event in the conditions of created nature, 
it begins with the Nativity of Christ, the birth of 
a human baby Jesus (as many other babies), and 
extends through his life and teaching towards his 
(human) death on the Cross. On the other hand, 
in the Christ-event understood by Christians as 
the Incarnation of God in human flesh, Christ 
recapitulates the long history of mankind and 
in that it rearticulates the hope of salvation, 
the promise of God to man and his Kingdom.32 
The hidden message of the Nativity, which later 
was set forth by Christ through his parable of 
the Kingdom, was a mystery, not accessible to 
everyone, but opened by Christ Himself to his 
followers. And when his disciples asked him 
what this parable meant, he said, “To you it has 
been given to know the secrets of the Kingdom 
of God; but for others they are in parables, so that 
seeing they may not see, and hearing they may 
not understand” (Lk. 8:9,10). The message of the 
Kingdom, which is manifested through the birth 
of Christ in Bethlehem, points toward a mystery of 
the union of man and God in Christ, man who was 
born in Palestine and God who, being in flesh, did 
not cease to be present hypostatically in the entire 
universe, being its ruler and provider of its order 
and harmony. Being in Palestine, he still was in 
the Kingdom, about which he taught his disciples. 
It is because of this that when theology asserts that 
the incarnation recapitulates the whole creation, 
it also asserts that the whole creation (from its 
beginning to the very end) is recapitulated from 
the perspective of the Kingdom of God. It is in 
Christ’s incarnation that the sense of the temporal 
span of the universe as having already passed but 
not outdated is revealed so that the universe was 
created and fashioned to receive God in flesh in 
order for the inauguration of the future of the 
Kingdom to take place. 
By pointing towards the age to come in his 
parables Christ encourages his disciples not to be 
preoccupied with questions about the facticity of 
his birth (and correspondingly to their own birth 
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and familial attachments), not to pose questions 
as “Why?” and “How?” Since the whole span of 
history is recapitulated by him, the contingent 
facticity of his arrival in the world in terms of 
space and time had no importance, whereas 
it had importance as the inauguration of the 
Kingdom whose realised presence endows with 
the future that which is here and now, in the past 
and present. This fragment of Christian literature 
can be considered as typology of anyone’s birth: 
the preoccupation with the contingent facticity of 
one’s embodiment, that is birth, is in vain since it 
is phenomenologically concealed from same one’s 
grasp. One cannot understand the meaning of the 
birth of a new person apart from formulating 
some necessary conditions for its happening. 
However the event of birth endows a person 
with freedom and a future; correspondingly the 
process of disclosure of the sense of birth as 
well as the necessary conditions related to its 
embodiment aspects is directed to their future 
and endowed with a certain telos (closely related 
to the sufficient conditions of one’s birth). Thus, 
in a Christian perspective, the sense of the event 
of one’s birth comes not only from some familial 
or historically contingent circumstances, but 
from an existential fact that a new-born person 
is endowed with a future and a potentiality of 
salvation and that this endowment cannot be 
traced back as having antecedents. At the same 
time the hope for salvation makes it still possible 
not to forget of birth as a God-given event: the 
acceptance of birth is thus based not in memory 
(which is not possible) but in faith. 
The question which naturally arises is 
whether, in its insistence on the unimportance 
of the historically contingent conditions of one’s 
birth in terms of potential salvation of a person, 
Christian teaching neglects cosmological aspects 
of the possibility of life and, in particular, the 
very possibility of the incarnation of God in 
flesh of Jesus Christ? The answer is obviously 
“not”. For the incarnation to take place on the 
earth, this universe must possess some features 
such that the generation of a human body capable 
of receiving God would be possible. This links 
the creation of the universe, its evolution 
and structure, to the phenomenon of man, its 
natural origin. The teaching on incarnation in 
theology articulates this link, making the sense 
of human presence in the universe as grounded 
in the will and love of the personal God, who 
transfers the image of his personality to human 
beings. This observation allows us to conjecture 
that the development of the universe before the 
incarnation of the Son of God in flesh on the 
earth, and after has, theologically speaking, a 
drastically different meaning. It was necessary 
for the universe to have such an origin and to be 
in a constructive development in order to sustain 
life on the earth and to allow God to condescend 
to us and to assume human flesh in order to 
initiate the new stage of salvation history. What 
will happen in the universe afterward, that is 
whether the universe as such possesses “a telos” 
(which may be related to the salvation history of 
humanity), is difficult to say, for according to the 
cosmological predictions, there is a natural limit 
to the extension of human life in the cosmos, 
so that the transferral of the saving telos to the 
universe will have a limited temporal span. 
Apart from this trivial link between the 
natural conditions for persons’ appearance in the 
universe and thus its physical structure and the 
possibility of the incarnation as the birth of Jesus, 
there is another more subtle connection between 
the incarnation and the origin of the universe as 
its creation. According to the Christian Creed the 
incarnation of the Son of God was present in God’s 
plan of salvation before the world was created. This 
implies that the actual event of the incarnation in 
rubrics of space and time took place having in 
its remote antecedents the creation of the world 
which at least provides the necessary condition 
– 194 –
Alexei V. Nesteruk. The Origin of the Universe and Event of Birth: Phenomenological Parallels
for the possibility of the incarnation. This implies 
in turn that since it was the incarnation of the 
Logos of God, by whom in turn and through 
whom the world was created, the incarnation as 
a contingent happening in human history carries 
in itself some traces of the purposiveness of 
the universe towards this incarnation, and the 
explication of this purposiveness initiated in the 
event of the incarnation is exactly the ongoing 
articulation of the Kingdom of God which was 
announced in Christ’s coming in this world. 
Thus the very articulation of this Kingdom in 
this universe presupposes its actual existence, 
that is its history initiated in its creation. Thus 
the eschatological aspiration for the Kingdom of 
God implies the elucidation of the meaning of 
creation of the universe: to understand the sense 
of creation one must proceed along the lines of 
the saving telos in humanity of Christ. In this 
sense the understanding of the incarnation of 
God cannot be detached from the disclosure of 
the sense of creation. Humanity, being endowed 
with the Divine image thus contains a hidden 
“memory”33 of that creation when “all was in all”; 
correspondingly every particular birth of persons 
brings into the realm of phenomenological 
experience the presence of that ill-articulated 
otherness (with respect this particular creation) 
that is being attempted to be disclosed through 
the free movement into one’s future by which one 
was endowed at birth. 
The final theological analogy which 
somehow unites archetypically human birth 
and the origin of the universe proceeds from a 
non-trivial spatial paradox which inheres in the 
doctrine of the incarnation. Its essence, briefly, 
is: on the one hand, Jesus Christ, being in his 
nature fully human, lived being located in body 
in a particular place and time of earthly history; 
on the other hand, Jesus Christ was fully God, 
who did not leave his “divine place” and who, 
being God, not only was present in Palestine two 
thousand years ago but was always present in all 
places and times of the universe created by him 
and through him. One observes here a nontrivial, 
historic-topological relation between the finite 
track of Jesus in empirical space and time and 
its extraordinary link to the whole history of the 
visible universe.34 The human nature in Christ 
was operating within the reality of empirical 
space and historical time, whereas Christ’s 
divine nature was always beyond the empirical 
and intelligible aeons, in the uncreated realm 
of the kingdom of God, which can be expressed 
symbolically in terms of the “boundaries” of 
the created if these “boundaries” are seen from 
the divine dimension. It is from this “outside” 
that Christ the Logos of God coordinated the 
empirical space where he indwelled in the body 
with the rest of the created universe, including 
its temporal origination which is detected by 
cosmology. In this sense the incarnate Christ, 
being fully human, knew everything about the 
beginning of the universe, because remaining 
God, he “saw” this beginning from the “other” 
side of it. He was present in all locations and 
eras in the universe hypostatically and hence 
through knowledge of it. Thus he looked at the 
spatial and temporal span of the universe from 
a perspective of an act of creation, which as 
such could not have any spatial and temporal 
distinctions. Thus the whole universe was “seen” 
to Christ-Son of God as a single point, as a flash 
of the unconditional love of God with respect 
to the world. Here the human archetypical 
“memory” of the “all in all” receives its origin 
from an observation that for Christ the spatial 
and temporal extension in the world did not 
exist because he, while being fully man, still 
saw the world by the eyes of the Son of God. 
In this seeing the origin of the world was a 
particular human projection of the history of 
the universe as having a temporal beginning. 
Correspondingly, humanity, by being endowed 
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with the divine image, incessantly searches for 
this origin as the lost communion with “all in 
all”.
From Phenomenology  
of Birth to the Big Bang as a Telos  
of Cosmological Explanation 
Now we are in a position to summarise our 
discussion by bringing together all observations 
concerned with both the idea of the origin of the 
universe and inexplicable nature of one’s birth. 
From what we have already said one can easily 
grasp that the search for the origin of the universe 
is rooted in a psychological desire to understand 
one’s own origin35, that is, the sense of one’s own 
biological birth, understood in a philosophical 
sense as the mystery of hypostatic incarnation. 
In the same way as an event of a human being’s 
birth is unavailable to phenomenalisation in 
consciousness, whereas its phenomenality 
unfolds while this being constitutes itself in its 
progression to the future, one can say that in 
cosmology the origin of the universe is present 
only in its actual absence, so that all attempts 
to articulate this origin (as intentionality 
of consciousness directed to the future) are 
doomed to deal with the unfolding facticity of 
the universe without any hope to achieve the 
“presence of the past in presence”36. It is in this 
sense that the very advance of cosmology towards 
understanding the past of the universe constantly 
deals not only with its unknowable essence but 
also with an unavoidable absence. In spite of the 
metaphysical fact that the origin of the universe, 
as its foundation, as the originary, as well as the 
origin of ones’ person are radically unavailable 
to humanity because of the contingency of their 
facticity37, cosmology still intends towards the 
principally unknowable and absent past as if it 
would become knowable and present at some 
distant future. Here cosmology exercises not so 
much its intrinsic creativity of constructing a 
variety of mathematical cosmological models, 
but rather that intrinsic teleology, that is 
purposiveness of enquiry into the sense of nature 
which is implanted in the very essence of the 
human condition. This condition, if one affords 
a theological terminology, can be expressed 
as man’s desire not to be circumscribed by the 
necessities of the given nature and inevitability 
of the universe’s facticity, and to see the universe 
(and hence articulate it) according to man’s will 
and in its own image38. To know thyself means 
to know the universe. To know thyself means to 
understand the indestructable presence of the 
immanent self-consciousness which is always 
intending its own origin but, failing to fulfil 
its intentions, this self-consciousness appeals 
to the indefinite context of totality to which it 
desires to refer itself. Consciousness functions 
in the conditions of its intentional immanence 
to the universe; thus the searched foundation of 
consciousness as such, that is the ground of its 
facticity, implies the ground for the universe to 
which the immanent intentionality is directed. 
Then, if in the natural attitude consciousness 
thinks of its own origin in temporal terms (as 
birth), the origin of the universe also acquires 
some features of temporality and this leads to 
varieties of the Big Bang models. In a complete 
incapacity to establish the origin of the incarnate 
transcendental subjectivity in rubrics of ground-
grounded relation, the understanding falls back 
into the natural attitude and physicalises its 
own origin by displacing it to the beginning of 
the universe where the idea of the beginning of 
the universe appears as a result of the human 
will (psychologically, because of the fear of 
contingency of birth which implies death, one 
wishes to establish a reference to a sort of stability 
which attaches some sense of existence forever) 
and its particular teleological mode. One argues 
then that the tendency to search for the origin of 
the universe is deeply embedded in the human 
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condition, being a kind of an innate idea, donated 
to every human being at the event of birth.39 
Theologically, this is an idea of the Divine image 
in man and an archetype of its lost likeness when 
man, like God, knew all because he was “all in 
all.”40 
We have already analysed in detail the 
dynamics according to which this innate idea 
realises itself in cosmology. Let us discuss 
here briefly the nature of that hidden aporia 
in attempting to think the Big Bang, which G. 
Marcel called a “meaningless pretence.”41 When 
cosmology predicates the idiosyncratic past of 
the universe, a characteristic displacement of 
the self of cosmologists takes place when they 
invoke (and thus consciously descend into) 
such a condition of the universe in which no 
incarnate conscious life was possible. The more 
a cosmologist’s mind, in its eidetic reduction 
of the empirical, advances towards the Big 
Bang, the more it intends something which is 
fundamentally non-human. By circumscribing 
conceptually the allegedly physical content of 
the early universe, the self, its consciousness, 
works in a such mode of intentionality, in which 
intentions will never be filled and fulfilled 
because they are contradictory to the conditions 
of the life-world as a necessary condition for this 
consciousness to function. From a philosophical 
point of view one finds here not only an urge 
of the human psyche to find the impersonal 
“foundation” of the facticity of the world at 
the expense of losing the sense of uniqueness 
and identity of every particular human person, 
but also the loss of the sense of humanness. 
Characteristically those philosophising 
cosmologists who believe that through studying 
the alleged origin of the physical universe they 
touch upon sacred truth (for some pointing 
towards God) related to the mystery of one’s 
birth, in fact, dissolve themselves in the abyss of 
non-human physics, which, although being a very 
interesting eidetic exercise, turns out to be devoid 
of any spiritual and soteriological meaning. (In 
fact this is a sort of triviality: all physics per se 
is devoid of ethics, spirituality and teleology. 
However physics, which grounds its foundation 
in something which excludes life becomes, an 
intrinsically contradictory, inhuman enterprise.) 
A corresponding cosmology begins to predicate 
the universe in esoteric (mathematical) and non-
existential (not having immediate references 
to the realities of the life-world) language 
which is accessible only to those who follow 
this cosmological gnosis (in this it recalls all 
mystical philosophical systems of antiquity). 
Such a cosmological gnosis ignores obvious 
philosophical doubts about the ontological 
universality of its claims and objectivity based 
in the natural attitude. That is why from the 
critical stance of a phenomenological stream of 
thought it seems paradoxical to claim the object-
like status of the Big Bang models (or different 
pre-existing universes – multiverse) which, 
in spite of being mental creations in the life-
world exclude any incarnate consciousness.42 
Gnostic cosmologists sometimes believe that 
the asserted ultimate reality of the past universe, 
where all forms of matter were present in a kind 
of undifferentiated soup, has more relevance 
to the truth of existence than the variety of 
mundane and contingent experiences and that 
it is the meditation of this primaveral “reality” 
that fills one’s life with content and meaning. In 
spite of the implicit teleological intentionality 
hidden behind such cosmological constructions 
there is one element in them which remains 
disturbing and existentially irrelevant, namely, 
the so called “lure of cosmos”43 driving the 
cosmological mind in the search for the cradle of 
life in the “cosmic heaven” and which is deeply 
interwoven with the discomfort and anxiety 
arising from the inevitability of the transience 
and mutability of objects and lives of this earthly 
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world, which tragically contradicts the human 
longing for all-encompassing knowledge and a 
certain immortal sense of that which happens 
here and now. This anxiety inheres in the event 
of birth so that it comprises the innate idea 
presupposing a hidden teleology of the human 
spirit in explicating this event. In this sense all 
speculations on the origin of the universe are 
unavoidable as pertaining to the very essence of 
humanity in articulating its own purposiveness 
in the universe. 
It is phenomenology which makes it possible 
to change the overall attitude to cosmology and 
its theories of the beginning of the universe 
because, by realising its telos hidden in the event 
of birth, phenomenology acts as that mode of 
thinking which unfolds the hidden teleology of 
scientific research and teleological meaning of 
some particular scientific ideas.44 This teleology 
appears as an endless commitment to a theoretical 
task (understood philosophically) so that each 
particular scientific result or theory is considered 
as temporary and provisional and must be put aside 
while looking for the successive developments. 
Cosmology in this sense is not an exception and 
represents no more than a very sophisticated set 
of eidetic reductions from the empirical. The 
existential meaning of cosmology, its own ground 
and its sheer possibility, can only be understood 
if cosmology is referred to its roots in human 
subjectivity and to the cultural dimensions of the 
life-world, and thus to the hidden teleology of 
reason. Correspondingly the persistent exercise by 
cosmology of that intentionality which is directed 
towards the removal of the contingent facticity of 
everything and searching for the foundation of 
the universe (its originary origin as if “all was in 
all”)45, reveals the meaning of the notion of the 
Big Bang as the telos of cosmological explanation 
(as well as a telos of the human reason enquiring 
about the foundation of its facticity in the life-
world in general). 
In the natural attitude the meaning of the Big 
Bang was to describe the temporal origin of the 
universe as if it took place in the physical past: 
this was the ideal and telos of cosmology, that is 
to find such an expression of the original state of 
the universe which would allow one to describe 
in terms of species the variety of cosmic objects 
observed in the sky. The Big Bang, being the 
telos of cosmological research which advances 
and unfolds the sense of the universe forward 
in time, is allegedly placed within the natural 
attitude of the human mind in the physical past. 
Here we see the competing tendencies of human 
subjectivity which cannot function properly if 
this subjectivity is not “purified” by being placed 
within the phenomenological attitude. For that 
one who is in the natural frame of mind there is 
a paradox: how can we talk about the Big Bang 
as a telos, that is something which is supposed to 
be in the future, if this Big Bang is, by definition, 
supposed to be in the past? 
As we argued above, the natural attitude 
to the Big Bang, that is putting the origin of the 
universe and time under the rubrics of datum, 
must be abandoned on simple grounds that its 
construct is achieved by means of a series of eidetic 
reductions, so that its physical characteristics, 
even if one admits the high degree of coherence 
in its theoretical description, make no sense in the 
context of what it is supposed to describe, namely, 
the present-day universe and the life-world. 
Then, by being a fundamentally unfinished and 
unfinishable construct, all existing and future 
theories of the Big Bang have equal weight and 
importance if they are treated from within a 
strictly scientific discourse: the idea of the Big 
Bang can only be a “normative form situated at 
infinity”.46 Thus each historical realisation of 
cosmology in its theories still has the idea of the 
Big Bang (as the hidden totality of all) within its 
historically contingent scope. The philosophical 
importance of cosmology becomes evident if it 
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is appropriated phenomenologically, when the 
reduction of all historical facticity of its theories 
is performed and the essence of cosmology as a 
search for the foundation of contingent facticity of 
all is realised. In this case the presence of the Big 
Bang theories in cosmology reflects the deep and 
inherent propensity of humanity to enquiry into its 
own origin and facticity, and then in the facticity 
of all that is given to humanity in the event of 
birth. This is what Husserl called entelechy of the 
reason, the reason which attempts to disclose the 
meaning of the universe in the perspective of its 
telos, when it will be united to the entire universe, 
that is, when for this reason “all will be in all”.
But cosmological thinking does not 
anticipate its own intention for the Big Bang as a 
“teleological principle” of the working of the mind 
itself. The natural attitude of a cosmologist treats 
the Big Bang in terms of objectivity pertaining 
to a remote hypothetical past, its consciousness 
does not realise that, in fact, in allocating the Big 
Bang to the past, it acts from the present and its 
actions are initiated by the telos (of cosmological 
explanation) with which humanity is endowed at 
the event of birth, that is the telos which is always 
in the future with respect to both the event of birth 
and the origin of the universe. The philosophical 
sense of this oblivion of the human presence 
behind all theories is that cosmology as well as 
any science is incapable of contemplating the 
purposes and ends of nature which are accessible 
to humanity through its ability to feel the anxiety 
of being born and the teleology it is endowed 
with. 
One can clarify the meaning of the Big 
Bang as a telos of scientific explanation by 
reminding oneself that the observable universe 
is always turned to us by its past: because of 
the finitude of speed of light, signals travel 
from the space to reach us, so that we detect the 
information from the sky not as it is here and 
now, but as it was at the time of its emission in 
the past. In the language of theory of relativity, 
the universe is observed along the past light 
cone, where the human observer, being at its 
apex, while progressing into the future still 
faces the universe only in its past and the realm 
of the unconcealed past expands together with 
the progression of the observer to the future. 
In spite of the fact that our capacity to observe 
the universe is restricted by the era when matter 
decoupled from radiation and the universe 
effectively became transparent for propagation 
of light, in its exploration of the early stages of 
the universe theoretical cosmology goes beyond 
this limit in the past (as was mentioned before 
some cosmologists believe that their theories are 
physically verifiable up to one second after the 
Big Bang) and attempts to model the processes 
in the universe up to the point of its temporal 
origination approximately 14 billions years ago. 
The advance of cosmological research, as the 
process directed to the future (the future which is 
also phenomenologically concealed) explores in 
more and more detail the allegedly existent past. 
Thus our knowledge of the past expands in the 
future. It is in this sense that one can claim that 
the future of the cosmological research results 
in expanding of our knowledge of the past. The 
“past of the universe” becomes the “future of 
cosmological explanation”, so that the Big Bang 
as the ultimate goal of explanation, becomes the 
telos of this explanation. 
In different words, the human observer 
progresses in its knowledge of the universe by 
moving into the so called future by its back, 
that is by always turning by its eyes towards the 
past. The Big Bang then appears as the Ideal of 
cosmological explanation at which the human gaze 
is always turned. The content of its knowledge 
is represented by the ever expanding base of the 
“cone of knowledge” so that future knowledge 
will acquire more and more content of the past. 
Thus the telos of cosmological explanation, its 
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ongoing goal and anticipation, is the past of the 
universe – the Big Bang. 
Conclusion:  
Phenomenological Parallelism  
Between Birth and Origin  
of the Universe Versus Genetic Similarity
In conclusion we would like to rearticulate 
major points discussed in this paper by making 
a certain contrast with another line of thought, 
introduced in the philosophical treatment of 
cosmology under the title of “genetic similarity” 
between the development of the universe and 
development of a particular human being.47 
This idea appears as a natural inclination of 
the human mind to understand the universe 
along a certain teleology related to the fact of 
existence of human being and thus to the fact 
that the universe is observable and knowable. 
Correspondingly a hidden teleology implied 
in formation of an individual human organism 
is arbitrary transferred to a sort of similar 
“teleology” in formation of the universe. The 
idea is simple: according to a particular view at 
cosmology there were two major stages in the 
development of the universe. The first one is the 
famous “inflation”, or the exponential expansion 
of the universe near its very beginning, which 
took place in the region of 10-36 – 10-34 sec after 
the “origin” at the cosmological singularity 
corresponding to the absolute zero of time.48 The 
remarkable feature of this stage of expansion 
is that the universe, depending on different 
scenarios inflates in size at least by a factor 
1027, thus expanding the universe approximately 
from a size of 10-27 cm to 1cm. This remarkable 
figure shows that the matter in such a universe 
is subjected to an incredible transformation 
in terms of space: being initially in a grain of 
space it experienced a change in size which is 
“astronomically” huge in comparison with what 
it had started. Then within the next 300,000 
years the universe expanded by approximately 
the same factor to the size of 1025 cm when 
matter decoupled from radiation and became 
transparent, that is that visible universe we face 
as sky. In other words within 3x106 years (which 
constitutes approximately a grain of time of 1 
out of 2x105 corresponding to about 14 billion 
years of the predicted age of the universe), the 
universe expanded by a factor of 1052 whereas for 
effectively the same last 14 billion years it has 
only expanded by a factor of 103 to its estimated 
present size of 1028 cm. What stuns imagination 
is a strange non-uniformity in the rate of change 
of the universe’s scale (at least 27 orders of ten) 
during an infinitesimal transition from 10-36 to 
10-34 sec on the one hand, and the long 14 billion 
years for nearly the same order of scale growth 
up to the present state of the universe. 
This incommensurability of rates of 
change in the development of the universe 
which, from the point of view of physics, is a 
contingent fact, is brought, quite arbitrarily, 
into correlation with the fact of biological 
development of a human being, namely that it 
develops in its prenatal stage from the size of 
a chromosome or the order of 10-7 cm to the 
size of the new-born baby of, let say, 50 cm 
and then during the whole span of life its size 
grows only 3-4 times. In other words, there 
was an “inflation” in the prenatal development 
of a human being, that is a growth in size of 
10 million times within 9 months, and then a 
very slow development to the adult state, let’s 
say within 20 years, when the size of a human 
being reached, let’s say, 2 m. This contingent 
analogy was proclaimed as a “principle of 
genetic similarity between anthropogenesis and 
cosmogenesis.”49 The author of this “principle” 
recognises that it probably does not advance 
either cosmology or anthropology since it has 
a heuristic character. Indeed this principle 
functions only on the level of consubstantiality 
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between human being and the universe by 
making some particular suggestions on how this 
consubstantiality develops through the prism of 
either the universe’s evolution or an individual 
human development. The analogy is developed 
in the natural attitude assuming in advance the 
presence of developed intentionality grasping 
this analogy. This implies that “the principle 
of genetic similarity” does not establish any 
phenomenological insight in the event of birth 
and the endowment of a human being with 
personhood, that is the future and freedom of its 
creative acts, which transcend nature, including 
the universe itself. Indeed the hypothesis of 
genetic similarity does not venture to make any 
speculation on the origin of personhood, that 
is on the act of birth as coming into existence 
of otherness and freedom from bonds of nature 
which tends to subordinate personhood to its 
uniform conditions. Whereas our analysis of the 
phenomenology of birth was mostly concerned 
with the formulation of its phenomenality as 
not related directly to the natural conditions 
of birth. It does not mean that birth is a 
singular and unrelated event: on the contrary 
birth itself is a response to “a pre-existing 
invitation-to-relationship”.50 In this sense birth 
is an event in the mode of nature, where its 
potentiality for freedom and future points to 
a pre-natural factor, a hidden personal centre 
which transcends all datum and meaning, an 
existential factor of referential reciprocity or 
relationality. A relation that is implied here is a 
relation to that transcendent other with respect 
to which the very event of birth affirms itself 
as an existential response of generating a new 
other. On the one hand the event of birth of a 
person is free from any antecedent definition 
in the realm of the natural conditions (the 
necessary conditions for sentient life do not 
provide the sufficient conditions for creation 
of persons), on the other hand the birth of a 
person is a response to invitation which as such 
is not naturally conditioned but is related to that 
non-originary origin which man attempts to 
constitute through its movement to the future 
granted at birth. And it is here that the unique 
and incommunicable mode of personal existence 
manifests itself as a unique way of constituting 
the sense of birth. The uniqueness of personhood 
of a new-born lies exactly in the fact that it is 
not a dualistic reflection of parents and has an 
independence from the constitutive principle of 
life in general. And here the implicit teleology 
in explicating one’s birth, which cascades up 
towards a teleological way of explicating of the 
origin of the universe, comes in contrast with a 
naturalistic teleology implied in the hypothesis 
of genetic similarity. But the latter, having got 
an arbitrary character is subject to that critique 
of purposiveness of nature which has been done 
by Kant in this Critique of Judgement. 
And finally, in spite of these obvious 
differences between the phenomenological 
parallelism between an event of birth and 
the Big Bang, developed by us, an interesting 
observation can be made related to a hypothesis 
of genetic similarity that the prenatal stage in 
the development of human beings, that is that 
stage which immediately precedes physical 
birth is very rich in term of communion of an 
embryo, that is future full-bodied human being, 
with physical reality on those spatial scales 
which are not accessible to our empirical contact 
in the state of adulthood. In other words, if one 
suggests that there is a sort of memory of prenatal 
states of consciousness (even undeveloped) at 
the microscopic scales of communion with the 
physical universe, this memory can act as the 
overwhelming and bedazzling experience of 
coming into being from something “other” than 
that from which the developed adult realises itself. 
This other can be the universe, and communion 
with that other is the communion with the 
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universe. In this sense the phenomenology of 
birth, as the constant inerasable presence of the 
non-originary origin of personhood can point 
towards the phenomenality of the universe and 
its non-originary origin.
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1 I argued elsewhere that cosmology, because of its peculiar “subject matter” – the universe as a whole, exhibits some fea-
tures of the human sciences (Nesteruk , 2011).
2 See a now classical book of (Barrow, Tipler, 1988) as well as a recent collection of articles on fine-tuning: (Barrow et al., 
2008). 
3 Here one can observe the presence of two tendencies, contradictory, from a phenomenological point of view: on the one 
hand, physics and cosmology represent an example of eidetic reduction of the historical plurality to a-historical physical 
laws (driven by differential equations with no intrinsic time); on the other hand, the internal temporality of consciousness 
realised uniquely in different persons and thus implicitly making an ontological difference between them, as well as sub-
jective time, are “contra-reduced”, so that the cosmological time is considered as existing objectively and independently 
of the human subjectivity, as if it could be grasped in the natural attitude. In the former case we effectively deal with the 
eidetic reduction, whereas in the latter case we deal with the procedure which is opposite to the transcendental reduc-
tion. 
4 C.f. (Clément, 2000, p. 30). 
5 A concise expression of what it meant (relevant to our discussion) can be found in (Ladriere, 1972, p. 153): “The cosmo-
logical myth is an account of cosmogenesis. It tells how the world was made, how the contemporary world that stands 
before our eyes developed from what went before, from the non-world, the formless... The schema of the representation is 
a successive unfolding in which there is a movement from homogeneous unity to a qualitatively differentiated multiplic-
ity…”
6 An example of such a symmetry is postulated in the cosmological principle (the uniformity and isotropy of the universe 
on the level of clusters of galaxies) as the principle of non-observability of contingent deviations from uniformity. All 
observable non-uniformity such as our solar system of the Milky Way exhibit the breakdown of that symmetry on a much 
lesser scale than clusters of galaxies. 
7 On the analogy of the ancient Greek quest for the underlying matter and contemporary physics see (Feinberg, 1966). 
8 Jean Charon compares a relationship between man and the universe as that one of an enfant to his/her mother, the relation-
ship which is based on love and reminiscent to that of the love of ancient Greek philosophers to the cosmos (Charon, 1974, 
p. 14). Contemporary cosmology, according to him, making a grandiose picture of the physical universe “disincarnates” 
this universe in the sense that the relation of love and communion is broken, so that, using the words of G. Marcel, cosmo-
logical theory attempts to “crash man by the weight of astronomical facts” (Marcel, 1940, p. 32).
9 According to Hawking, temporal flux is a “figment of imagination”, so that the “real” underlying world is a-temporal, that 
is either trans-temporal or simply ever-existing. (Hawking, 1988, p. 139.) Here we have an example of dismissal not only 
of the internal time-consciousness, subjective time, historical time, but also the objective physical time. Temporality as a 
basic category of the world of living beings is eliminated. 
10 The detailed explanation of this can be found in a paper of (Isham, 1988). See also (Nesteruk, 2006, pp. 169-191). 
11 (Hawking, 1988, p. 139). Its physical meaning (saying nothing at all about it existential meaning) is completely unclear. 
For Hawking, however it was not a problem at all, for according to his suggestion “the so called imaginary time is really 
the real time, and that what we call real time is just a figment of our imaginations.
12 The apology for such a cosmology led Hawking to the dismissal of the idea of God as creator, in his famous phrase “What 
place, then, for a creator?” (Hawking, 1988, p. 141). This is in amazing correspondence with that which was predicted, and 
criticised, by E. Husserl in his Crisis of the European Sciences, namely that extreme mathematization of nature makes 
human beings to believe that they rule their own affairs in the universe by believing that the universe as it is described 
mathematically is ultimately true, so that they replace God (Husserl, 1970, p. 66).
13 Some arguments that theoretical cosmology implicitly uses as its methodology coherence of justification instead of the 
principle of correspondence were put forward in my papers (Nesteruk, 2009, 2011).
14 See a detailed philosophical and theological analysis of Hawking’s ideas in (Nesteruk, 2003, pp. 141-159). (In Russian, see 
(Nesteruk, 2006, pp. 191-218)).
15 On a neo-platonic interpretation of Hawking’s model see (Nesteruk, 2003, pp. 145-152) or in (Nesteruk, 2006, pp. 198-
208). 
16 See a popularised version of his ideas in (Penrose, 1989, pp. 435-447), as well as in (Penrose, 2005, pp. 686-734).
17 In the language of mathematics this choice corresponds to such a setting of the initial conditions in which the high degree 
of order was present and is mathematically described by the so called Weyl Curvature Hypothesis. The explicit pictorial 
representation of this choice is given in (Penrose, 1989, p. 444) and (Penrose, 2005, p. 730).
18 (Marcel, 1952, p. 8, emphasis added). 
19 As was formulated by J. A. Wheeler, “The past is theory. The past has no existence except as it is recorded in the pres-
ent….Is the term ‘big bang’ merely a shorthand way to describe the cumulative consequence of billions upon billions of 
elementary acts of observer-participancy reaching back into the past?” (Wheeler, 1985, pp. 366-7.) See more on his ideas 
in (Wheeler, 1996, in particular pp. 299-302).
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20 (Marcel, 1940, p. 32).
21 Indeed in textbooks on cosmology as well as in popular books their authors sometimes give the graphical representation of 
the whole universe which manifests a typical representation of the universe as an “object” constructed in terms of quantity 
and magnitude. 
22 Kant famously described this situation in terms of expunging of teleology from the natural science in his Critique of 
Judgement, $ 68 (5:833): “this is done in order to restrict the study of nature, mechanically considered, to that which we 
can so subject to observation or experiment that we are able to produce it ourselves as nature does, or at least by similar 
laws. For we see into a thing completely only so far as we can make it in accordance with our concepts and bringing it to 
completion.”. This translation is from (Kant, 1972, p. 172). 
23 This is what Heidegger called in his analysis of a technological acquisition of the world “enframing”. “Enframing” in 
cosmology means that the universe shows itself to the extent of a particular human demand where it cannot manifest on 
its own terms. This “enframing” comes not only from the limits of technology used in observational cosmology, but from 
the very special and incomplete nature of the human cognitive faculties related to the understanding. As was suggested in 
a paper of (McLaughlin, 1985), the very quantity of distinguishable objects in the universe, that is its material content, is 
limited because of the limits imposed by the categories of understanding. 
24 (Marcel, 1965, p. 24).
25 Rephrasing a famous thought of Heidegger on the essence of technology, if the essence, the coming to presence of tech-
nology of cosmological research, “enfraiming” as the danger of leaving behind all other aspects of the universe, is the 
universe itself, then cosmological research, that is interaction with the universe, will never allow itself to be mastered, 
either positively or negatively, by a human doing founded merely on itself. Cosmology understood widely, whose essence 
is the universe itself, will never allow itself to be overcome by man. In a different context this correspond to that which is 
called the apophaticism in knowledge as inability to exhaust by means of signifiers of that which is studied. 
26 One means here that given the large-scale structure of the universe it is empty of any possibility of life at least in what 
concerns the visible universe. Correspondingly only these scales can be described by cosmology with a great effi-
ciency. 
27 One could list a variety of such diagrams and graphical presentation scattered in popular scientific books. What is typical 
to all of them is that the universe presented as a thing in the form of consciousness as if this consciousness is positioned 
somewhere outside the universe. The main philosophical flaw encoded in these diagrams is that the universe as a whole is 
apprehended in the natural attitude which is impossible because of the immanence of the universe to the field of conscious-
ness. 
28 The stance on humanity as hypostasis of the universe is developed in chapter 7 of (Nesteruk, 2003) as well as in some other 
papers quoted therein.
29 This situation with respect to the person of the other was characteristically formulated long ago by Gabriel Marcel: “The 
other as other exists for me only in so far as I am open to him (insofar as he is a thou), but I am only open to him insofar as 
I cease to form a circle with myself within which I somehow place the other, or rather, the idea of the other; for in so doing, 
the other becomes the idea of the other, and the idea of the other is no longer the other as such, but the other qua related to 
me, as dismantled, as dismembered or in the process of being dismembered” (Marcel, 1991, p. 75). Here is another quote 
from Olivier Clément elucidating this point: “To know something of the mystery of the person, we must go right beyond its 
natural context, beyond its cosmic, collective, and individual environment, beyond all the ways in which it can be grasped 
by the mind. Whatever the mind can grasp can only be the nature, never the person. The mind can grasp only objects, 
whatever is open to inspection. But the person is not an object open to inspection, any more than God is. Like God it is 
incompatible, inextinguishable, fathomless.” (Clément, 2000, pp. 30-31). (See a vast discussion of this issue in (Yannaras, 
2005), (Levinas, 1987). 
30 See on phenomenology of birth (Marion, 2003) as well as (Marion, 2002, pp. 41-44). See also (Romano, 1998, pp. 95-112) 
and (Henry, 2003, pp. 123-142).
31 (Marcel, 1935, p. 243). English translation from (Marcel,1952, p. 249) is corrected.
32 See, for example, Irenaeus of Lyons, Against the Heresies, III 13, 1. 
33 The word “memory” is used here metaphorically as a constituting aspect of the human soul or its divine image. Corre-
spondingly the “remembrance” of “all in all” of the creation comes through faith in God. In similarity with what wrote 
Augustine, that human soul remembers God “not because it knew him in Adam, or anywhere else before the life of this 
body, or when it was first made in order to be inserted into this body” for everything “has been erased by oblivion” 
(Augustine, The Trinity, XIV, xiv (21)), the “memory” of “all in all” originates in God himself. In his Confessions, X, 
xxvi (37) he asks and responds: “Where did I find you [God] to be able to learn of you…if not in the fact that you tran-
scend me [above me]?” Indeed to have a memory of “all in all” one is to be in communion with God either in faith or in 
unbelief. 
34 On the problem of paradoxes linked to the dogma of the incarnation and spatial structure of the universe see (Torrance, 
1997), as well as the paper with reference to Patristic resources (Torrance, 1974).
35 The similarity between both is formulated in the quotation from G. Marcel as a prologue to this paper. 
36 Martin Rees, the Astronomer Royal, assessing the reliability of cosmological theory with respect to the early universe, 
wrote in one of his papers that “I would now place 99% confidence in the extrapolation back to one second [from the ulti-
mate beginning of the universe, AN]”. (Rees, 2003, p. 24). Whatever is beyond of this 1 sec. towards the Big Bang is not 
subject to a strict verification even by theory itself and as Rees expressed himself, he leaves a 1% chance of being deluded 
by theory of what was before 1 sec. In this sense the ultimate “originary” origin of the universe, as its pre-existent past 
cannot be brought to presence in presence even by means of theory, thus leaving us with its unavoidable absence. 
37 (Marcel, 1965, p. 24). 
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38 This is a theological conviction, supported in particular by a 7th century Byzantine Saint Maximus the Confessor who 
taught that God knows things not according to their nature, but according to his will (See Ambigua, 7. PG 91, 1085B.) Cor-
respondingly human beings, because of the divine image in them, imitate this desire to know according to their will. 
39 Jean-Louis Chrétien, discussing the sense of the unforgettable (immemorial) in human life, and referencing to Male-
branche, invokes an idea of being as something similar to that innate idea which we put under the rubrics of the “originary” 
origin of the universe: “The mind breathes only through being which is more original to us than ourselves. We are of being 
more than of ourselves. This unforgettable and incessant presence of being to mind is not an object for the mind, but the 
mind’s very opening, its only light, and its condition of possibility.” (Chrétien, 2002, p. 86.) 
40 C.f. (1 Cor. 15:28). 
41 (Marcel, 1965, p. 24).
42 One could suggest along the lines of the anthropic inference in cosmology that the non-human past of the universe was a 
necessary condition for the later appearance of life, so that there is no contradiction between what the Big Bang cosmology 
affirms as the non-human physical state and what emerged from this states afterwards. The naivety of this argument is 
based in the belief in the continuity of cosmological as well as biological evolution which led to emergence of conscious-
ness which articulates this same evolution as well as its origin. The difficulty lies in the part of this argument which sup-
posed to deal with the sufficient conditions of emergence of consciousness. These conditions are not part of physics and 
rather belong to the realm of human will and destiny. It is in this sense, that when F. Dyson in his book (Dyson, 1979, p. 
250) argues, along the lines of the anthropic argument, against J. Monod’s apology for the accidental coming of intelligent 
humanity in the universe, by saying that “I do not feel like an alien in this universe. The more I examine the universe 
and study the details of its architecture, the more evidence I find that the universe in some sense must have known that 
we are coming” he effectively invokes a teleological argument by reference to the existence of another, parallel sense of 
the universe’s future as the unfolding of transcendental history through which the physical history is articulated. But this 
“knowledge” by the universe that we were coming cannot be consistently placed in the framework of scientific explana-
tion. It is rather an axiological and soteriological argument which refers to the teleology of human reason. 
43 This term was used by N. Berdyaev, who discussed the theme of “cosmic temptation” in (Berdyaev, 1944, pp. 93-102).
44 The ideas about teleology of scientific research were developed by E. Husserl in his last work The Crisis of the European 
Sciences. See also a paper (Rizzacasa, 1976).
45 C.f. (1 Cor. 15:28). 
46 To understand this means to avoid mythology in questions of the beginning of the universe. As it was expressed long ago 
by Hannes Alfvén: “It must be absolutely clear that if a scientist makes a guess about the state of the universe some billion 
years ago, the chance that this guess is realistic is negligible. If he takes this guess as the starting point for a theory, this is 
unlikely to be a scientific theory but very likely will be a myth.” (Alfvén, 1977, p. 13).
47 See (Pavlenko, 2003; 2004; 2008).
48 The absolute numerical values of the beginning and of the inflationary phase of expansion vary in different books on 
cosmology. See, for example, (Liddle, 1999, pp. 102-3). 
49 See (Pavlenko, 2003, p. 48).
50 (Yannaras, 2004, pp. 171-182).
References
H. Alfvén. “Cosmology: Myth or Science?”, Cosmology, History and Theology (New York, 
Plenum Press, 1977). – pp. 1-14.
J. Barrow, F. Tipler, Anthropic Cosmological Principle (Oxford, Clarendon, 1988). 
J. Barrow, S. Morris, S. Freeland, Ch. Harper (Eds.) Fitness of the Cosmos for Life. Biochemistry 
and Fine-Tuning (Cambridge University Press, 2008). 
N. Berdyaev. Slavery and Freedom (London, Centenary, 1944).
J. E. Charon. L’homme et l’universe (Editions Albin Michel, 1974).
J.-L, Chrétien. The Unforgettable and the Unhoped For (New York, Fordham University Press, 
2002). 
O. Clément. On Human Being (New York, New City Press, 2000). 
F. Dyson. Disturbing the Universe (New York, Basic Books, 1979).
G. Feinberg “Physics and the Thales Problem”, The Journal of Philosophy (LXIII, No. 1, 1966). – 
pp. 5-17. 
S. Hawking. A Brief History of Time: From the Big Bang to Black Holes (London, 
Bantam, 1988).
M. Henry. De la phénoménologie. Tome I. Phénoménologie de la vie (Paris, Presses Universitaire 
de France, 2003).
– 204 –
Alexei V. Nesteruk. The Origin of the Universe and Event of Birth: Phenomenological Parallels
E. Husserl. Crisis of the European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology (Evanston, 
Northwestern University Press, 1970).
C. Isham. “Creation of the Universe as a Quantum Process”, Physics, Philosophy and 
Theology: A Common Quest for Understanding (Vatican City State, Vatican Observatory, 1988). – 
pp. 375-408. 
I. Kant. Critique of Judgement (New York, Dover Publications Inc., 1972).
J. Ladrière. Language and Belief (Dublin, Gill and Macmillan, 1972).
E. Levinas. Time and the Other (Pittsburgh, Duquesne University Press, 1987). 
A. Liddle. An Introduction to Modern Cosmology (Chichester, John Wiley & Sons, 1999). 
G. Marcel. Journal Metaphysique (Paris, Gallimard, 1935).
G. Marcel. Du Refus a l’Invocation (Paris, Galllimard, 1940).
G. Marcel. Metaphysical Journal (London, Rockliff, 1952). 
G. Marcel. Being and Having (London, Collins, 1965).
G. Marcel. Être et Avoir (Paris, Editions Universitaires, 1991).
J.-L. Marion. “The Event, the Phenomenon and the Revealed”, Transcendence in Philosophy and 
Religion (Bloomington and Indianapolis, Indiana University Press, 2003). – pp. 87-105. 
J.-L. Marion. In Excess. Studies of Saturated Phenomena (New York, Fordham University Press, 
2002). 
W. McLaughlin. “Kantian Epistemology as an Alternative to Heroic Astronomy”, Vistas in 
Astronomy (1985, # 28). – pp. 611–133.
A. Nesteruk. Light from the East ( Minneapolis, Fortress Press, 2003). 
A. Nesteruk. Logos and Cosmos ( Moscow, St. Andrew’s Biblical Theological Institute, 2006). 
(in Russian).
A. V. Nesteruk. “From the Unknowability of the Universe to the Teleology of Reason: 
A Phenomenological Insight into Apophatic Cosmology”, Knowing the Unknowable: Science and 
Religion on God and the Universe (I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd, 2009). – pp. 63-86.
A. V. Nesteruk . “Cosmology at the Crossroads of Natural and Human Sciences: is Demarcation 
Possible?” (Journal of Siberian Federal University. Humanities & Social Sciences. Part. 1, vol. 4, n. 4, 
2011, pp. 560-576, Part 2, vol. 4, n. 5, 2011, pp. 644 -666).
A. N. Pavlenko. “A Place of ‘Chaos’ in the New World ‘Order’”, Voprosy Filosofii (N 9, 2003). – 
pp. 39-53. (in Russian).
A. N. Pavlenko. “Universalism and Cosmic Harmony: A Principle of Genetic Similarity”, Skepsis 
(XV(i), 2004). – pp. 389-401. 
A. N. Pavlenko. “European Cosmology: between ‘birth’ and ‘creation’”, Scientific and Theological 
Thinking of Ultimate Questions: Cosmology, Creation, Eschatology (Moscow, St. Andrew Biblical 
Theological Institute, 2008). – pp. 128-130. (in Russian).
R. Penrose. The Emperor’s New Mind (Oxford, New York, Melbourne, Oxford University Press, 
1989). 
R. Penrose. Road to Reality (London, Vintage Books, 2005).
M. Rees. “Our Complex Cosmos and its Future”, The Future of Theoretical Physics and 
Cosmology. Celebrating Stephen’s Hawking’s 60th Birthday (Cambridge University Press, 2003). – 
pp. 17-37. 
Alexei V. Nesteruk. The Origin of the Universe and Event of Birth: Phenomenological Parallels
A. Rizzacasa. “The Epistemology of the Sciences of Nature in Relation to the Teleology of 
Research in the Thought of the Later Husserl” The Teleologies in Husserlian Phenomenology. 
Analecta Husserliana (1976, vol. 16, Dordrecht, D. Reidel Publish. Comp.). – pp. 73-84. 
C. Romano. L’événement et le monde (Paris, Presses Universitaire de France, 1998). 
T. Torrance. Space, Time and Incarnation (Edinburgh, T & T Clark, 1997), 
T. Torrance. “The Relation o f the Incarnation to Space in Nicene Theology”, The Ecumenical 
World of Orthodox Civilization, Russia and Orthodoxy, vol. 3, Essays in Honour of Georges Florovsky 
(The Hague, Mouton, 1974). – pp. 43-70.
J. A. Wheeler. “Bohr’s ‘Phenomenon’ and ‘Law without Law’ ”, Chaotic Behaviour in Quantum 
Systems. Theory and Applications (New York, Plenum, 1985). – pp. 363-378.
J. A. Wheeler. At Home in the Universe (New York, American Institute of Physics Press, 1996).
C. Yannaras. Postmodern Metaphysics (Brookline, Holy Cross Orthodox Press, 2004).
C. Yannaras. Variations on the Song of Songs (Brookline, Holy Cross Orthodox Press, 2005).
C. Yannaras. Person and Eros (Moscow, Rosspain, 2005). (in Russian).
Происхождение вселенной и событие рождения:  
феноменологические параллели
А.В. Нестерук 
Университет Портсмута 
Лайон Гэйт Бюлдинг, 
ПОРТСМУТ, РО1 3НF, Великобритания
В статье проводится феноменологический анализ проблемы происхождения вселенной. Мы 
проводим точку зрения, что идея так называемого Большого Взрыва представляет собой 
завуалированную проблему случайной фактичности наблюдаемой вселенной. В ней воплощена 
интуиция об ограниченности трансцендентального сознания, отнесенного как ко всему 
человечеству, так и каждой индивидуальной личности. Представление о Большом Взрыве 
аналогично интуиции о сокрытом начале человеческой жизни, которое человек пытается 
эксплицировать в процессе своего развития. Тот факт, что как начало вселенной, так и 
начало человеческой жизни феноменологически сокрыты от сознания, указывает на то, 
что любое вопрошание о них составляет базовую тревогу существования, его «космической 
бездомности», которую человечество пытается преодолеть. Интересным является то, что 
начало жизни и вселенной эксплицируется посредством движения в будущее, так что и то 
и другое становится телосом либо антропологического, либо космологического объяснения. 
Этот контринтуитивный результат напрямую обязан феноменологическому исследованию 
космологии как представляющей структуру человеческой субъективности.
Ключевые слова: космология, вселенная, происхождение, рождение, сокрытость, 
феноменология, телос.
